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“Isn't it pretty to think so.” 
 
Ernest Hemingway 
The Sun Also Rises 
 

  
ABSTRACT 
     What happens if we imagine seeing something while we are listening to something? Will 
it change what we hear? What happens if we imagine hearing something while we are 
looking at something? Will it change what we see? In everyday perception, our brains 
integrate the information provided to us by our different senses in order to form a coherent 
perception of the world around us in a process referred to as multisensory integration. 
However, sometimes the information provided to our senses arises from within, as is the case 
when we imagine a sensory stimulus; for example, when you picture in your mind the face of 
a loved one, or imagine how they sound when they say your name. The term mental imagery 
is used to refer to these willed simulations of sensory stimuli in our minds. Empirical research 
on mental imagery has demonstrated that there is a great deal of similarity in how we 
consciously experience, and in how our brains process the sensory stimuli we imagine and 
the sensory stimuli we perceive from the external world. However, whether our brains 
integrate stimuli that are imagined in one sense and perceived in the other has never before 
been explored. The main aim of this thesis was to investigate this possibility. 
    There were two main goals of the work comprising this thesis.  First, to examine whether 
mental imagery is integrated with incoming sensory stimuli from a different sensory modality 
to change perception, and second, to examine the neural correlates of these mental imagery-
induced changes in perception. Multisensory illusions have come to be a hallmark of 
multisensory integration as they are an easy and demonstrable way of measuring the 
integration of cross-modal sensory stimuli. Here, we have made use of classic multisensory 
illusions, and adapted them to investigate whether mental imagery in one sensory modality 
can integrate with veridical sensation in another sensory modality to produced fused 
multisensory percepts. We also used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to 
examine whether brain areas related to multisensory integration of real stimuli were involved 
in multisensory integration of real and imagined stimuli.  
      By supplanting a real sensory stimulus with an imagined one in three different classic 
multisensory illusions, we found that imagined sensory stimuli were integrated with real 
sensory stimuli from a different sensory modality to change perception. Moreover, we found 
that these imagery-induced multisensory illusions followed the same spatial and temporal 
rules as classic multisensory illusions (Study I), as well as the unity-assumption rule of 
multisensory integration (Study II). Furthermore, we found that the neural correlates of a 
mental imagery-induced multisensory illusion were closely related to those known to be 
involved in integration of real multisensory stimuli (Study III). Lastly, consistent with what 
is known about adaptation to real multisensory stimuli, we found that repeated pairings of 
imagined and real stimuli from different sensory modalities lead to changes in future 
perception of the latter (Study IV).  Together, these findings suggest that, indeed, what we 
imagine hearing can change what we see, and what we imagine seeing can change what we 
hear, affording mental imagery a larger role in multisensory perception than has ever before 
been considered.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 MENTAL IMAGERY 
imag·i·na·tion  (i-ˌma-jə-ˈnā-shən) n. 1. The act or power of forming a mental 
image of something not present to the senses or never before wholly perceived 
in reality (“Imagination”, 2016) 
     As humans, we have an uncanny ability to imagine sensations in our minds at will. If I 
asked you to imagine seeing your nation’s flag, or to imagine hearing the voice of a loved 
one, or the tactile sensation of a kiss on your cheek, you would probably have an easy enough 
time doing that. It is a fascinating, almost oxymoronic ability we have: to see what we do not 
see, to hear what we do not hear, to move what we do not move, to feel what we do not feel. 
Of course, despite how peculiar it seems on the surface, for most of us, it is a completely 
ordinary part of our lives. We do it when we daydream (read: procrastinate), when we 
imagine descriptions we read in a book (you are welcome E. L. James), and, perhaps most 
importantly, when we cannot remember what comes after the letter Q in the alphabet, and 
rehearse the ‘alphabet song’ in our mind to help us along.  We imagine all sorts of things that 
we are not perceiving all the time, yet figuring out what exactly these mental images are, how 
they are generated by the brain, and their purpose, is—to put it figuratively for maximum 
imagery within this paragraph—one slippery bar of soap.  
     This act of imaging—or imagination as one might call it—has come to be called mental 
imagery by those who study it; mostly in order to avoid confusion with the more fanciful 
interpretations of the word imagination, and perhaps to create some distance from it in order 
to sound more scientific. Imagination is just one of those words that means too many things 
to too many people anyway, and so for our purposes, I will use the phrase mental imagery to 
refer to our ability to generate sensory experiences in our mind of things we are not actually 
perceiving: what you ‘saw’ when you imagined the flag, what you ‘heard’ when you 
imagined the voice of the loved one, and what you ‘felt’ when you imagined the kiss on your 
cheek in the examples above. Although philosophers and great thinkers have pondered the 
nature of mental imagery since antiquity, it was not until late into the 19th century, with the 
development of experimental psychology, that it really moved into the realm of scientific 
inquiry (Kosslyn, 1994). 
     As the field of experimental psychology really started to get going at the turn of the 20th 
century, a lively debate began to develop amongst experimental psychologists about the 
nature of mental imagery.  At the real heart of the debate was a disagreement about how 
‘perception-like’ mental imagery is.  On one side, there were those who argued that there is 
no fundamental difference between the things we imagine in our mind an the things we 
perceive (James, 1890; Kosslyn, 1994; Perky, 1910).  On the other side of the debate were 
those who argue that there is some other underlying mental process at play that is 
fundamentally different from perception (Pylyshyn, 1973, 2002). This argument would be 
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taken up in different ways throughout the 20th century, but the gist of the argument remains 
the same.  
     In addition to believing that mental imagery and perception did not differ in kind, 
proponents of the perception-like theories in the early part of the 20th century, believed that 
mental images were the most fundamental form of thought (Boring, 1942; Danziger, 1979; 
Titchener, 1902). That is, that all the thoughts we have, however complex, could be reduced 
to sensory-like impressions in our mind. Researchers on the other side of the debate, 
however, believed to have found empirical evidence of ‘imageless thought’—thoughts that 
were completely devoid of sensory information (Angell, 1911; Boring, 1942).  As was 
common practice in the early days of psychology, both sides conducted experiments that 
relied mostly on ‘trained-observers’ to introspect on the contents of their mind, and therefore 
both sides of the debate tended to produce results consistent with their theory (of course). 
This debate would ultimately contribute to a loss of faith in what can be learned by studying 
the contents of the mind at all, and the field of psychology would move towards studying 
behavior (i.e., behaviorism) almost exclusively for several decades (Hothersall, 2004).  
     In the later part of the 20th century, researchers would begin to investigate the contents of 
the mind once again, this time with new theories and new experimental techniques. And as 
the field began to revive itself, so to did the debate about mental imagery. On one side of the 
argument were proponents of the ‘picture-like’ (or analog) theory of mental imagery, arguing 
once again that the images we conjure up in our minds are very much like pictures; they are 
copies of sensory impressions from the external world that maintain essential features of the 
physical world (Halpern, 1988; Kosslyn, 1973, 1994). On the other side, were proponents of 
propositional-theory (also known as discrete theory), proposing that mental imagery is the 
product of a language-like more basic form of thought. That is, that mental imagery is the 
result of accessing and combining discrete symbols, which form an abstract (rather than 
analog) impression of the thing in mind, and that this is sufficient to account for our 
perception-like experiences when we imagine stimuli (Pylyshyn, 1973, 2002).  
    This debate in its original form, however, has died down considerably in recent years, with 
behavioral and neuroimaging studies having made great strides in our understanding of 
mental imagery and its relation to perception. Proponents of perception-like theories of 
imagery have come to modify their theories to accommodate mental processes that are 
decidedly non-sensory-like, while still maintaining that mental imagery and perception still 
rely on overlapping mechanisms (Borst, Kosslyn, & Denis, 2006; Kosslyn, 1994). 
Propositional theory on the other hand, has few hard-lined supporters today; mainly in light 
of its inability to account for mounting evidence that mental imagery and perception seem to 
rely on largely overlapping, rather than distinct neural representations (Ganis, Thompson, & 
Kosslyn, 2004; Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001; Kosslyn, 1994). Nevertheless, vestiges 
of this debate still exist, and there are those who are still opposed to the idea that mental 
imagery and perception rely on largely overlapping mechanisms. Many arguments today 
against perception-based theories are methodological in nature.  The most common criticism 
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of behavioral experiments involving mental imagery is that tacit knowledge (i.e., that the 
participants implicitly know what the experiment is designed to study and respond 
accordingly, even if unintentionally) or by response bias (i.e., that the participants know what 
the experiment is aimed towards and consciously alter their behavior to conform to what they 
believe is expected of them) can account for results of studies demonstrating similarities 
between mental imagery and perception.  In neuroimaging experiments, the criticisms are 
usually levied against the neuroimaging technique itself or other un-accounted for or inherent 
confounding variables.  These concerns are not groundless, and experimental psychologists 
and cognitive neuroscientists have gone to great lengths to try to address these concerns. In 
this next section, I will give an introduction to some of the research that has shaped our 
current understanding of mental imagery that is important for this thesis. I will begin this 
section with the early behavioral studies on mental imagery and then move onto more recent 
behavioral and neuroimaging studies. Importantly, I will mainly focus on findings on visual 
and auditory mental imagery, as most of the most classic findings in the field concern these 
sensory modalities, as do the studies (i.e., Studies I-IV) in this thesis.  
1.2 MENTAL IMAGERY AND PERCEPTION 
     Our everyday experience tells us that when we see something, and we imagine seeing 
something, that these two conscious experiences—one real and one imagined—are similar in 
some ways but different in others. For instance, when you imagine your nations flag, you see 
in your mind all the features of the flag, its colors, its overall shape, the distance between 
symbols or lines, etc. At the same time, however, you are certainly aware that you are not 
actually looking at a flag, and all the features of the flag described above, are not as clear, or 
as sharp as they would be if you were actually looking at a flag, are they? Why are these two 
experiences different? Is it because mental imagery is fundamentally different than 
perception—that is, mental imagery involves a different underlying process than 
perception—or is it that mental imagery fundamentally the same as perception, but differs 
only in strength or vividness? Much of the work in experimental psychology has attempted to 
establish the latter argument against those who claimed the former. 
     One of the earliest, and certainly one of the most fascinating, studies on mental imagery 
was an experiment conducted by a woman named Mary Cheves West Perky. Perky devised 
an ingenious experiment in which she asked participants to look at a screen in front of them 
and to imagine seeing specific objects on that screen. The objects were simple objects like a 
tomato, a book, a banana, an orange, a leaf, and a lemon. Perky then played a trick of sorts on 
her participants: she (well her assistants did, anyway) surreptitiously presented a patch of 
color (matched in size and shape to each of the objects) on the screen while the participants 
were imagining the objects (Perky, 1910). The fascinating part of the experiment is that none 
of the twenty-seven participants (well, except for three who were thrown out of the study 
because of some clumsy mishandling of the projection apparatus: nice job assistants!) noticed 
that the objects Perky displayed on the screen in front of them were real rather than imagined. 
The participants had confused their mental imagery with real percepts that they were actually 
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seeing! The participants were even surprised at how what they imagined sometimes looked 
different than they expected it to (e.g., the banana being upright when they meant to imagine 
it flat), and were even sometimes indignant when asked at the end of the experiment whether 
they were sure they had imagined the objects (Perky, 1910). This study was the first to 
provide strong empirical evidence for the notion that imagery and perception are very similar 
indeed.  
     Further research on the topic of visual mental imagery was concerned with whether the 
spatial properties of visual perception and visual imagery were comparable. To this end 
Stephen Kosslyn, and colleagues devised a series of experiments in which participants were 
shown fictional maps or drawings to memorize (Figure 1) and where subsequently quizzed 
on the details of these maps. Specifically, participants memorized a map such as the one 
presented in Figure 1 and were then verbally given one object on the map, asked to close 
their eyes and form a mental image of the map, and then moments later verbally given a 
second item on the map. The participants were then asked to trace the distance between the 
first location and the second location in their mind. 
 
Figure 1. How far from the hut to the well? Example map (left) and results (right) from Kosslyn, 
Ball, & Reiser (1978). The plot on the right demonstrates the strong linear relationship between the 
distance between object pairs (e.g., the hut and the well) and their physical distance on the physical 
map that was memorized. This finding provided support for the notion that our visual mental 
imagery is picture-like by demonstrating that the time it took to scan between objects of a map in 
our mind scaled according to the true physical distance between the objects on that map.  
     The results from these experiments revealed a strong positive correlation between the time 
it took to scan the distance between two objects in the participants’ minds and the physical 
distance on the maps they had memorized. Subsequent experiments demonstrated that the 
time it took to scan the distance between two objects also increased if the physical size of the 
same map was increased (in this case size does matter). That is, if the map in Figure 1 was 
printed on a poster rather than in this thesis and you memorized the poster-sized map, and I 
memorized the thesis-sized map, it would require more time for you to trace the distance 
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between the hut and the well in your mind than it would for me. Kosslyn concluded that, 
combined, these results demonstrated that the spatial relationship between objects in the 
physical world appeared to be preserved, suggesting that mental imagery is quasi-pictorial in 
nature rather than descriptive (Kosslyn, Ball, & Reiser, 1978; Kosslyn, 1973). 
     It was argued however, that rather than demonstrating the preservation of spatial content 
in visual mental imagery, these findings could merely represent the participants’ ability to 
simulate the physical laws of moving objects (Finke & Pinker, 1982) because the participants 
were specifically instructed to imagine an object moving from one location to another. And 
even more seriously, it was argued that these findings may merely be due to tacit knowledge 
about the purpose of the experiment in light of the fact that a similar relationship between the 
response times of participants and the physical distance between objects could be obtained 
when participants were asked to trace the distance in their mind between fictional locations 
for which they were only ever told the distances verbally (Mitchell & Richman, 1980; 
Richman, Mitchell, & Reznick, 1979). Follow-up experiments managed to provide support 
for Kosslyn’s original interpretation, however.  By using simple random dot patterns, asking 
participants to remember the locations of the dots, then taking them away, and placing an 
arrow that either pointed to a location where a dot was or not.  In these experiments, the 
participants were to indicate whether the arrow pointed to a location where a dot was 
previously.  The key manipulation here, is that when the arrow did point to the location where 
a dot was, the distance between the arrow and a dot varied from 4-12cm. Just as in Kosslyn’s 
original study, and without the explicit instruction to imagine scanning the distance between 
the arrow and the dot, the participants’ reaction times to determine whether the arrow pointed 
in the location of a dot or not increased as the distance between the arrow and the previous 
location of the dot increased (Finke & Pinker, 1982). This suggests that when the participants 
were asked to determine whether there was a dot in a specific location they implicitly formed 
a mental image and mentally scanned the image to determine whether there was a dot in a 
particular location (with the arrow being their starting point)(Borst et al., 2006; Borst & 
Kosslyn, 2008; Finke & Pinker, 1982). These studies re-affirmed the notion that the spatial 
content of visual stimuli is preserved in visual perception.  
     Similarly, studies on auditory imagery investigated whether the temporal features of 
auditory stimuli were preserved when imagining auditory stimuli and came to a similar 
conclusion. In experiments that I can only imagine must have felt to the participants a little 
like being a contestant on a game show, Andrea Halpern (1988) gave participants a task in 
which they were presented with two one-word song lyrics from familiar songs, and asked to 
determine whether the second song lyric was from the same song as the first (Halpern, 1988). 
The songs used were “Do re mi” (from The Sound of Music),  “Hark the Herald Angles 
Sing”, and “The Star Spangled Banner” (the American National Anthem).  These songs were 
selected based on specific features critical to the experiment such as familiarity, whether they 
had lyrics that started on the odd-numbered beats from 1-13, and had unique words in the first 
phrase. Halpern found that the participants’ reaction time increased as a function of the 
relative distance between the two lyrics within the song. This means that it took the same 
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amount of time for participants to determine whether the second lyric was in the song if the 
first lyric was form beat 1 and the second was from beat 5 (relative distance = 4 beats) as 
when the first lyric was form beat 7 and the second was from beat 11 (relative distance = 4 
beats), but took less time when the first lyric was from beat 5 and the second was from beat 7 
(relative distance = 2 beats). Moreover, this finding was consistent regardless of whether the 
participants were instructed to imagine hearing the lyrics in their mind or whether they were 
given notes instead of lyrics. The results form Halpern’s experiments are consistent with 
Kosslyn’s experiments on the preserved spatial content of visual images in visual imagery, 
and suggest that there is a preserved temporal format for auditory perception.   
     These findings from visual and auditory imagery are conceptually aligned with the widely 
popular and ingenious experiments conducted by Roger Shepard and Jacqueline Metzler at 
Stanford University around the same time. Shepard and Metzler (1971) came up with a 
unique experiment designed to measure how we solve a very simple problem that can be 
summarized in the following terms: Are these two objects the same or different? Shepard and 
Metzler asked participants to examine pictures of two three-dimensional objects side-by-side, 
and determine as quickly as possible whether they were the same of object or not (see Figure 
2). The objects were either the same objects only rotated in the picture-plane (i.e., the picture 
of the object was rotated clockwise-or counterclockwise), the same objects only rotated in the 
depth-plane (i.e., rotated along their vertical axis within the picture), or they were different 
objects (see Figure 2 for examples)(Shepard & Metzler, 1971).  Shepard and Metzler (1971) 
found that the time it took for participants to determine whether the objects were the same 
(when they were in fact the same, only rotated) was correlated with the extent that the second 
object was rotated. That is, it took participants longer to determine that two objects were the 
same if they were rotated 80° than if they were rotated 60°.  This suggests that participants 
were creating an internal mental image of the object and then rotating it in their mind to try to 
match the other object.  These findings, along with others that would serve to rule out 
alternative explanations for this effect such as response bias or differences in eye movements 
(Cooper & Shepard, 1973), were some of the first and most convincing that mental imagery 
is perceptual rather than propositional.  
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Figure 2. Are the two objects the same or different? Example stimuli used in experiments by 
Shepard & Metzler (1971) demonstrating the importance of mental imagery in human cognition.  
The objects were either the same objects rotated on their face (e.g., 80° clockwise) (A), the same 
objects rotated in depth (e.g., 80° in along the vertical axis)(B), or two objects that were different 
(C).  Shepard and Metzler found that the time it took to determine whether the pairs were the same 
or not, was directly proportional to the degree of rotation no mater which plane the objects were 
rotated. These results suggest an important role of mental imagery in how we think2. 
     Further studies on mental imagery examined the interaction of mental imagery and 
perception ongoing perception. Many of these early behavioral studies were interested in 
examining the hypothesis that mental imagery and perception rely on overlapping neural 
representations, and therefore imagining sensory stimuli in a given sensory modality should 
inhibit or enhance sensory perception within that sensory modality. In this line, Segal and 
Fusella (1970) made use of psychophysics—an experimental technique in which some aspect 
of a stimulus is systematically varied as a participant makes perceptual judgments about that 
stimulus—in a modern version of the Perky effect described above. In this modernized 
version of the Perky effect, Segal and Fusella (1970) varied how visible visual stimuli were 
(from not visible at all to completely visible) while the participants indicated whether there 
was a visual stimulus present or not, and recorded on a trial-by-trial basis how well 
participants were able to detect the visual stimuli when they were imagining a visual stimulus 
                                                
2 This figure was reproduced with permission from the American Association for the Advancement of Science 
(License number: 3851970431432) 
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compared to when they were not imagining anything. Consistent with Perky’s original 
findings, they found that the participants were better at detecting the visual stimulus when 
they were not imagining anything compared to when they were imagining the visual stimulus. 
Moreover, they also found that participants were more likely to think they saw something that 
was not there when no visual stimulus was presented.  However, Segal and Fusella (1970) 
also wanted to examine whether this hindrance of visual perception was merely the result of a 
shift in attention when imagining the visual stimuli or whether it was because the 
participants’ visual imagery was interfering with their ability to perceive real stimuli because 
of overlapping neural representations. They reasoned that imagining an auditory stimulus 
should hinder visual perception in the same manner as imagining a visual stimulus if the 
effect is due to changes in attention; however, if the effect reflects competition for neural 
resources, auditory imagery should not hinder visual perception as much as visual imagery, 
and visual imagery should not hinder auditory perception as much as auditory imagery. The 
results from these experiments were in support of this idea: the participants’ performances 
were worst when they imagined a stimulus in the same sensory modality. These results were 
strong behavioral evidence in support of the notion that imagery and perception rely on 
overlapping neural representations.  
     Another study conducted in the same vein by Martha Farah, from the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology also made use of psychophysics to investigate the relationship of 
visual imagery and visual perception. Unlike the previous experiment, however, this study 
sought to examine whether there were instances in which visual imagery should facilitate 
visual perception, in order to try to dissociate purely propositional accounts of mental 
imagery (which purport that some independent non-perceptual process can explain effects 
found for mental imagery) from perception-based accounts of mental imagery (i.e., that the 
things we imagine are directly relatable to the things we perceive in the world). Farah argued 
that to make the case for the latter, it is important demonstrate that both the content and 
spatial format of the mental image were critical to alter visual perception. Thus, she examined 
whether imagining a specific letter facilitated visual processing of that letter, and when it was 
in the same location as the imagined letter. That is, if imagining the letter H facilitates 
processing of the letter H but not T, and this is due to a direct rather than abstract similarity in 
how we process imagined and perceived visual stimuli, it should only facilitate the perception 
of the letter H (and not T) and only when imagined in the same location. Indeed, this is 
exactly what Farah found: that if participants imagined a visual stimulus that was the same in 
content (e.g., imagine H; see H), and location, perception was significantly enhanced 
compared to when nothing was imagined or a different visual stimulus was imagined (Farah, 
1985).  Similar results were found for auditory imagery: Farah and Smith (1983) examined 
whether imagining hearing one tone facilitated perception of that tone vs. another tone in a 
detection task (a task in which participants judge whether a stimulus was present or not while 
the intensity of the stimuli are varied across trials). They found that imagining a tone 
selectively facilitated perceiving a tone of the same frequency, but not of a tone of a different 
frequency (Farah & Smith, 1983). Findings such these went a long way towards refuting 
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propositional theories of mental imagery, and provided strong behavioral evidence that 
certain aspects of mental imagery are perception-like rather than propositional. 
     More recent behavioral experiments on the similarities between mental imagery and 
perception, however, have evolved along with our understanding of human perception. One 
technique that has been fruitful in furthering our understanding of visual perception is 
binocular rivalry. Binocular rivalry is a visual phenomenon in which when one object is 
presented to one eye and a completely different object is presented to the other eye, our brain 
fails to merge these two objects, and we are only consciously aware of one object at a time 
(Blake & Logothetis, 2002).  This is conceptually similar to what happens when we look at 
ambiguous figures like the Necker cube and the duck/rabbit illusions (see Figure 3 for 
examples). Faced with conflicting pieces of information, our perception fluctuates between 
the two percepts. Unlike, in these ambiguous figures however, binocular rivalry has long 
been considered outside of our conscious control: we cannot consciously force ourselves to 
see one stimulus over the other (Blake & Logothetis, 2002). For example, in binocular 
rivalry, a house might be presented in one eye, and a face in the other eye, and rather than a 
fused combination of a house and a face, we fluctuate back and forth between seeing a house 
or a face without much control over it3. For these reasons, binocular rivalry is an ideal 
paradigm to study conscious visual perception and has been used extensively to examine 
which aspects of visual perception are related to early processing of the stimuli by the visual 
cortex, and which aspects are related to late processing by higher level visual cortices. For 
instance it turns out that certain illusions of visual perception that rely on early processing of 
stimuli are still present when the stimuli are suppressed from conscious awareness in a rivalry 
paradigm. For example, it has been found that the visual motion aftereffect (i.e., a visual 
illusion in which a static visual stimulus is perceived as moving in the opposite direction of a 
previously moving stimulus4) occurs for suppressed (i.e., not consciously perceived) moving 
stimuli (Lehmkuhle & Fox, 1975; O’Shea & Crassini, 1981). The effects of visual priming 
(i.e., the facilitation of visual perception via brief prior exposure to that visual stimulus) on 
the other hand, seem to be extinguished when the participant does not consciously perceive 
the visual stimuli, suggesting that priming is a process that requires conscious awareness of 
the stimuli and relies on a later stage of visual processing (Cave, Blake, & McNamara, 1998). 
These findings in the field of perception would be useful in disentangling the similarities and 
difference between mental imagery and perception.  
                                                
3 However, it should be noted that visual attention can modulate the temporal dynamics (rate and duration of 
switching) of rivaling stimuli with practice. If observers focus on one stimulus that is already perceived (i.e., 
dominant) carefully it can increase the duration that stimulus is consciously perceived (i.e., dominance) at the 
expense of the other, but switching still occurs none-the-less, outside of the observer’s control (Ooi & He, 1999). 
Furthermore, specific features of the rivaling stimuli (e.g., salience, contrast, context) will make one stimulus 
more dominant than the other (Blake & Logothetis, 2002). 
4 A classic example of this illusion is the ‘waterfall effect’, whereby if an observer looks at a waterfall for a 
period of time then looks to the trees or rocks to the side of the waterfall, they will appear to move upwards for a 
brief period.  
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     One study made use of the motion aftereffect described above to examine whether visual 
mental imagery of motion would lead to a visual motion aftereffect (Winawer, Huk, & 
Boroditsky, 2010). In this study, Jonathan Winawer and colleagues (2010) investigated 
whether imagining a visual grating stimulus (i.e., a series of dark grey horizontal bars 
spanning the length of the visual display equally spaced from each other vertically) altered 
the perceived motion of moving dots presented afterwards. By psychophysically varying the 
extent that the moving dots were random, ranging from all the dots moving upwards to all the 
dots moving downwards, and completely random motion in the middle, Winawer et al. 
(2010) found that imagining a visual grating moving upwards caused the participants to see a 
given set of moving dots as moving downwards and imagining the visual grating moving 
downwards caused the participants to perceive the same set of dots as moving upwards.  
Interestingly, further experiments using this paradigm found that even listening to 
descriptions of literal visual motion (e.g., “the squirrels were teaming up the tree”) and 
metaphorical motion (e.g., “stock prices were falling), lead to this motion aftereffect 
suggesting an inherent link between language comprehension and visual imagery (Dils & 
Boroditsky, 2010). In light of the studies on visual perception described above, these findings 
provided strong evidence in favor of overlapping representations of mental imagery and 
visual perception at a very early stage of visual processing. 
     Another study made use of the binocular rivalry paradigm described above to examine the 
effects of visual imagery on visual perception (Pearson, Clifford, & Tong, 2008a). If you 
recall, from the section above, I described experiments which found seemingly conflicting 
results: the Perky-effect studies found that visual perception was hindered by visual imagery, 
whereas the studies by Farah (in which the participants imagined Hs & Ts) found that visual 
mental imagery of an object facilitated visual perception of that object. While both studies 
nicely demonstrate that visual mental imagery can alter perception within that sensory 
modality, they do so with opposite results; the problem being that there is no visual 
perception analog here, and so there is no way to compare these results with imagery to 
results with visual perception. It could simply be that imagining visual stimuli in these task 
changes the way in which the participants attend to the visual stimuli. By utilizing binocular 
rivalry, however, Pearson et al., (2008) were able to examine whether visual mental imagery 
facilitated or hindered subsequent visual perception.  In this experiment, participants briefly 
(750 ms) viewed rivalry displays of a visual grating stimulus presented horizontally in one 
eye and a visual grating stimulus presented vertically in the other, then were either instructed 
to imagine the visual stimulus they just perceived (i.e., the dominant visual stimulus) or to 
imagine the visual stimulus they did not just perceive for 10 seconds. They found that when 
participants imagined the dominant visual stimulus, the stability of that visual stimulus was 
very high, whereas when they imagined the non-dominant visual stimulus, the stability of that 
visual stimulus dropped dramatically. That is, if the participant saw a vertical grating stimulus 
on the previous trial, and imagined seeing that stimulus for 10 seconds, they were more likely 
to see that stimulus again; however, if the participant saw a vertical grating stimulus and 
imagined a horizontal grating stimulus for 10 seconds, they were much less likely to see the 
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vertical stimulus again.  A benefit of this paradigm, in contrast to earlier studies presented 
above on the effects of imagery on perception, is that real visual stimuli could also be 
presented in the periods between rivalry displays and the result on visual perception could be 
compared with those of mental imagery.  In further experiments, Pearson et al. (2008) found 
that a weak visual stimulus presented in the 10 s periods between rivalry displays produced 
the same effect on visual perception stability suggesting that the observed changes in visual 
perception from visual imagery have the same underlying mechanisms as visual perception 
itself.   
     Another interesting experiment, which demonstrated a strong link between mental 
imagery and perception, measured pupil dilation in response to imagined visual stimuli 
(Laeng & Sulutvedt, 2013).  In this study, the participants imagined the same visual stimulus 
(e.g., a triangle) at different levels of luminance while their pupil diameters were measured. 
Laeng and Sulutvedt (2013) found that the participants’ pupils constricted when imagining a 
bright visual stimulus, but dilated when imagining dark visual stimulus. These changes in 
pupil dilation were very closely related to those of perceiving the same stimuli, and suggest 
that when one imagines a visual stimulus, it engages processes of visual perception at an 
early enough stage in processing that the pupils constrict to protect the eyes sensitive light-
absorbing cells (Laeng & Sulutvedt, 2013). One particularly striking aspect of this paradigm 
is that it runs counter to what one would expect if the results were due to cognitive effort, as 
previous studies have found that increasing cognitive effort is associated with increased pupil 
dilation (Hess E. & Polt J., 1964; Kahneman, Tursky, Shapiro, & Crider, 1969).  
     Despite the strong case made from behavioral evidence that mental imagery is perception-
like and relies on overlapping representations with perception, it has been argued that truly 
convincing evidence for either cannot come from behavioral experiments alone (Anderson, 
1978, 1979). This is a ‘black box problem’ of sorts: when we can only control what goes in 
and what comes out of the black box, there will always be differing interpretations for what 
goes on inside (Anderson, 1978, 1979; Farah, 1989b). To truly determine how what goes in 
affects what comes out, we must look inside the black box. In this analogy, for our purposes, 
our brain is that black box, and what ‘goes in’ is a stimulus, real or imagined, and what comes 
out is some measurable change in behavior (e.g., response times) or perception, but to fully 
rule out whether these changes can be accounted for by perception-like representations, 
language-like propositional representations, both, or neither, we have to look inside the brain. 
In this next section, I will give a brief overview of the literature that has looked inside the 
brain and their findings concerning mental imagery and perception.   
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Figure 3. Front or back; duck or rabbit? Examples of the Necker cube (A) and duck/rabbit (B) 
ambiguous image illusions. The red corner in the Necker cube can either be perceived as being in 
the front of the cube (i.e., closest to you) or on the inside of the cube (i.e., furthest from you). The 
duck/rabbit ambiguous image drawing was originally used by Joseph Jastrow (1900) to illustrate 
the malleability of perception, and can either be perceived as, appropriately enough, a duck or a 
rabbit.  
1.3 NEURAL FOUNDATIONS OF MENTAL IMAGERY 
     The neural basis for mental imagery is one of those things that are tricky to study in other 
animals. We cannot just ask a monkey or a mouse to imagine seeing or hearing something 
(even if we do so politely) while we record from electrodes in their brain5, and so the bulk of 
our knowledge on this subject comes from studies on humans. Some of the earliest evidence 
for the neural basis for mental imagery would rely on human lesion studies.  It was 
discovered, for example, that brain damaged patients who lost the ability to perceive color, 
also lost the ability to imagine color (De Renzi & Spinnler, 1967), that patients with damage 
to their parietal lobe who lost the ability to perceive visual stimuli on one side of their body 
(i.e., hemispatial neglect) also lost the ability to imagine stimuli on that side of their body 
(Bisiach & Luzzatti, 1978; Farah, 1989b). One interesting case study in this regard found that 
if you had the patient imagine themself in a particular location and imagine looking at the 
scene in a very familiar town square (Piazza del Duomo, Milan, Italy), they would accurately 
describe from their visual imagery, all the buildings on their right side, but not those from the 
left. If you then immediately had them imagine standing at the opposite vantage point in the 
square and describe the scene, they could now imagine and describe all the buildings on their 
right side that they could not just moments before. Moreover, they could no longer imagine 
or describe the buildings they had just imagined and described moments before that were now 
on their left (previously on their right) (Bisiach & Luzzatti, 1978).  In the case of auditory 
imagery, studies of patients with left or right temporal lobe excision (i.e., removal of their 
                                                
5 Although a close approximation might be possible: some interesting work which has recently been taken 
underway by researchers using associative learning paradigms in monkeys are making some strides in this 
direction; see (Albright, 2012) and Discussion (section 5) below for more on this.   
A B
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temporal lobes)—found that patients performed equally poorly on perceptual and imagery 
versions of a pitch comparison task. The imagery pitch comparison task in this study was 
similar to the pitch comparison task described above that was used by Halpern (1988) to 
investigate whether the temporal properties of auditory stimuli were preserved in imagined 
auditory stimuli. Participants were given two song lyrics of familiar songs and asked to 
compare whether the pitch of the first one was higher than the second, forcing them to 
imagine hearing the song. In the perceptual version of the task, the participants performed the 
same task, however, this time they actually heard the song while making their comparison. 
Zatore and Halpern (1993) compared lesion patients’ and healthy controls’ perception of 
familiar songs, and found that temporal lobectomy patients performed equally poorly on the 
imagery and perceptual versions of the task, compared to healthy controls who performed 
well on both tasks (Zatorre & Halpern, 1993). These findings were consistent with the idea 
that if imagery and perception involve shared representations, then we should see visual 
imagery impairments where we see impairments in visual perception. However, brain lesions 
are always large, involving damage to multiple areas, and interrupt the underlying white 
matter fiber tracts. Therefore, to determine whether mental imagery and perception rely on 
exactly the same cortical areas, neuroimaging experiments with good anatomical resolution—
functional magnetic resonance imaging in particular—would be needed. Neuroimaging 
experiments would expand upon the findings from lesion studies considerably, largely 
converging on evidence in favor of shared representations of mental imagery and perception. 
At the time of Stephen Kosslyn’s seminal review on the neural basis of mental imagery in 
2001, over 50 neuroimaging studies had been conducted on visual imagery alone (Kosslyn et 
al., 2001).  While I certainly will not cover all of these studies, I will try to survey some of the 
most influential neuroimaging studies on visual and auditory imagery that are relevant to the 
topic of this thesis. 
     Some of the earliest neuroimaging experiments examining the neural correlates of mental 
imagery made use of electroencephalography (EEG)—a neuroimaging technique in which 
electrodes placed on the scalp record fluctuations of electrical current generated by neurons in 
the brain (Nunez & Srinivasan, 2006).  Using EEG, Martha Farah and her colleagues (1989) 
showed participants words, specifically either concrete nouns (e.g., surfboard) or abstract 
nouns6 (e.g., escapism), and asked them to imagine the concrete nouns as vividly as possible 
and to simply view the abstract nouns while recording event related potentials (ERPs) (i.e., 
the time-locked response of an electrode to a stimulus)(Farah et al., 1989). They found that 
imagining the concrete nouns led to a significant positive difference in ERPs compared to the 
abstract noun (i.e., no-imagery) control for electrodes placed over areas involved in visual 
perception (i.e., occipital lobe). They found the same effect of imagery vs. no-imagery trials 
when participants were given the words verbally. Further experiments using EEG, made use 
                                                
6 Interestingly, abstract words were added to the experimental protocol as the no-imagery control because pilot 
studies revealed that participants found it too difficult not to imagine anything when presented with concrete 
words. This is consistent with research discussed above demonstrating the involvement of visual imagery in 
language comprehension (Dils & Boroditsky, 2010; Farah, Péronnet, Gonon, & Giard, 1988).  
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of perceptual facilitation effect of mental imagery on perception described earlier, in which 
imagining an H facilitated perception of an H, whereas imagining a T did not (Farah et al., 
1989; Farah, 1985). In this study, ERPs were recorded while the participants were imagining 
either an H or a T while detecting whether an H or T was presented. They found that mental 
imagery of a letter facilitated visual detection of the same letter, as they found before (Farah, 
1985), and that this perceptual facilitation was accompanied by changes in ERPs recorded 
from the occipital recording sites (i.e., over the visual cortex) compared to when they 
imagined a different letter than the one that was perceived (Farah et al., 1989).  These early 
studies investigating the neural basis of mental imagery using EEG were consistent with the 
notion of shared representations of mental imagery and perception; however, the poor spatial 
resolution of EEG limits what can be said about how much perception and mental imagery 
truly involve overlapping mechanisms. Experiments using other neuroimaging techniques 
would prove more useful in this regard.  
     Researchers have also made use of other neuroimaging techniques such as single photon 
emission computed tomography (SPECT) and positron emission tomography study (PET) in 
the search for the neural correlates of mental imagery. SPECT and PET are neuroimaging 
techniques in which a radioactive tracer is injected into the bloodstream of the participant and 
then measured by the scanner as tracer-laced blood flows to different parts of the brain over 
the time course of the task (Gulyás & Sjöholm, 2007; Rahmim & Zaidi, 2008). The 
functional capacity of these techniques, from a neuroimaging standpoint, relies on the fact 
that increased blood flow to different parts of the brain is tightly coupled with neural activity 
(J. J. Chen, Wieckowska, Meyer, & Pike, 2008; Logothetis & Wandell, 2004).  Goldenberg 
and colleagues (1988) conducted an experiment using (SPECT) that was conceptually similar 
to the EEG experiment described above in which participants were given lists of concrete 
words to imagine (Farah, 1989b; Goldenberg et al., 1989). Goldenberg et al. (1988) gave 
participants concrete words and asked participants to either imagine seeing the objects they 
referred to or to memorize the words while in the SPECT scanner and found increased blood 
flow (indicative of neural activity) to parts of the brain responsible for visual perception (i.e., 
occipital and temporal cortices). These findings were consistent with those from a (PET) 
study in which Roland and Friberg (1985) found increased blood flow to areas critical for 
visual processing (i.e., occipital, posterior parietal, and posterior inferior temporal areas) 
while participants imagined leaving their home and navigating through their neighborhood 
(Farah, 1989b; Roland & Friberg, 1985). They were also consistent with another PET study 
in which participants observed grids of different patterns of darkened and non-darkened 
squares, and were subsequently asked to indicate whether a darkened square was in a given 
location previously—a task which requires mental imagery (Kosslyn et al., 1994; Kosslyn, 
Thompson, & Alpert, 1997). This study found increased blood flow to areas of the visual 
cortex for this imagery task compare to control conditions in which the participants merely 
viewed the same stimuli (Kosslyn et al., 1997).  In the case of auditory imagery, converging 
evidence for shared representations of imagery and perception came from another study 
conducted using PET which found that imagining familiar tunes was associated with 
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increased blood flow to areas of the brain (i.e., the auditory cortex) commonly associated 
with processing auditory stimuli (Halpern & Zatorre, 1999). Because SPECT and PET 
involve the injection of radioactive tracer, they are rather invasive techniques and so the vast 
majority of the neuroimaging research conducted on mental imagery would be done using 
less expensive and non-invasive techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) 7. 
     Like PET or SPECT, fMRI is a neuroimaging technique that makes use of the changes in 
blood flow related to neural activity, however, unlike PET/SPECT, fMRI does not require the 
use of radioactive tracers. Instead, fMRI makes use of the blood oxygen level dependent 
(BOLD) response; capitalizing on the fact that increased neural firing consumes oxygen (and 
glucose), which is then replenished by oxygen rich blood. Due to the difference in the 
magnetic properties of oxygen-rich blood (i.e., oxyhemoglobin is diamagnetic) and non-
oxygen-rich blood (i.e., deoxyhemoglobin is paramagnetic), this causes distortions in the 
magnetic field that are then measured by a radiofrequency coil around the participants head. 
Early fMRI studies investigating the neural correlates of mental imagery largely sought to 
elaborate upon the findings from earlier lesion and PET studies with new experimental 
designs and questions concerning the extent of the involvement of early sensory cortices in 
mental imagery. The first fMRI study on mental imagery examined BOLD responses to 
imagining objects (e.g., a tree) compared to baseline BOLD activity, and perceiving those 
objects compared to baseline BOLD activity. This study revealed largely overlapping 
activations for visual imagery and visual perception in portions of the frontal, parietal, and 
occipital-temporal cortices (Ganis et al., 2004). In the first study on auditory imagery using 
fMRI, BOLD responses were compared between conditions in which the participants viewed 
silent videos of everyday scenarios and imagined hearing the associated sounds (e.g., 
someone blow-drying their hair) and a control condition in which the same videos were 
digitally scrambled. They also compared BOLD responses between viewing the same videos 
but while hearing the associated sounds and the scrambled-video control condition (Bunzeck, 
Wuestenberg, Lutz, Heinze, & Jancke, 2005). They found that the hearing the sounds led to 
increased activity in the primary auditory and secondary auditory cortices, and imagining the 
sounds lead to increased activity in the secondary auditory cortex (Bunzeck et al., 2005).  
These studies converged with those form lesion, EEG, and PET/SPECT studies, in showing 
that imagery and perception seemed to rely on mostly overlapping rather than distinct neural 
representations. So, it is settled then. Mental imagery and perception share overlapping and 
not distinct neural representations, right? Well, not quite. It remained to be gleaned from the 
studies presented above whether imagining sensory stimuli could activate primary sensory 
cortices. Such a finding would stand as a strong refutation of propositional theories of mental 
                                                
7 It is important to note that as fMRI became more widely available, PET/SPECT neuroimaging studies 
measuring regional blood flow alone have become largely obsolete due to their invasiveness and cost. Many of 
the current neuroimaging studies using these techniques today make use of different radioisotopes catered to 
questions concerning the underlying neurobiology of regional brain activation, which is something fMRI cannot 
assess (Small et al., 2008). 
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imagery (i.e., non-perception-based theories), and so many subsequent fMRI (and PET 
studies) would serve to establish whether mental imagery could activate early sensory 
cortices.  
     The vast majority of neuroimaging studies on visual imagery would come to affirm the 
notion that visual mental imagery can activate the primary visual cortex (Kosslyn et al., 
2001); and although early studies on auditory imagery have been more mixed about the 
involvement of the primary auditory cortex when it comes to imaging auditory stimuli, recent 
evidence seems to converge on a consensus that auditory imagery also activates the primary 
auditory cortex (Oh, Kwon, Yang, & Jeong, 2013). Concerning visual imagery, some of the 
most convincing evidence of activation of the primary visual cortex comes from a study 
which made use of retinotopic mapping—mapping the visual input from the eyes on the early 
visual areas of the cortex (Van Essen, Newsome, & Maunsell, 2002)–to compare imagining 
and perceiving visual objects of different sizes and found that imagined visual stimuli 
activated the earliest portions of the visual cortex (i.e., area 17) and that the locus of 
activation in this area shifted with the size of the imagined visual stimulus in the same 
manner as real visual stimuli (Tootell, Hadjikhani, Mendola, Marrett, & Dale, 1998).  
Similarly, although studies have found activation of the primary auditory cortex for 
imagining non-speech auditory stimuli (e.g., simple tones or music without lyrics)(Kraemer, 
Macrae, Green, & Kelley, 2005; Yoo, Lee, & Choi, 2001), the most convincing evidence for 
shared representations of perceived and imagined auditory stimuli comes from a study which 
made use of tonotopic mapping—mapping the frequency of sounds presented to the ears to 
the early areas of the auditory cortex (Saenz & Langers, 2014)–and found that imagining 
tones of different frequencies selectively activates portions of the primary auditory cortex 
(i.e., Heschl’s gyrus) responsible for perceiving those frequencies (Oh et al., 2013). Together, 
these studies, and others like them, went a long way towards refuting propositional accounts 
of mental imagery, and suggested that early sensory cortices are involved in imagining the 
low-level features of sensory stimuli. 
     Further neuroimaging studies on mental imagery have approached the problem of whether 
imagery and perception involve overlapping neural representations by examining whether the 
content (rather than specific features such as the size of the stimuli) of imagined sensory 
stimuli led to same content specific brain activation of perceived stimuli. To get to this 
question, however, one must first have an understanding of which areas are responsible for 
content specific visual perception. Neuroimaging and electrophysiology studies making use 
of binocular rivalry (described in section 1.2 above) have pointed to a distinction between 
early visual areas (i.e., striate cortex) and later visual areas (i.e., extrastriate areas), with the 
former being involved in representing low-level spatial features of visual stimuli provided by 
the retina, and the latter being involved in the conscious perception of visual stimuli (Tong, 
Nakayama, Vaughan, & Kanwisher, 1998; Tootell et al., 1998).  Although it was believed 
early on that conscious visual perception of stimuli is resolved by the primary visual cortex 
(Blake, 1989), electrophysiology recordings in monkeys found very little selectivity for the 
consciously perceived visual stimulus within the primary visual cortex during binocular 
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rivalry (Logothetis & Schall, 1989). This suggested that conscious visual perception is 
resolved at a later stage of visual processing. The question is where? Tong and colleagues 
(1998) addressed this question in a neuroimaging experiment using binocular rivalry on 
humans. They had participants view binocularly rivaling stimuli (i.e., a house and a face) and 
asked them to report their conscious visual perception while recording BOLD responses from 
regions just outside the primary visual cortex (i.e., extrastriate areas) which are known to 
respond selectively to house and face stimuli (Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998; Kanwisher, 
McDermott, & Chun, 1997), and found that the participants’ conscious visual percept 
selectively correlated with activity in these areas as if the visual stimuli were presented one at 
a time (i.e., monocularly) (Tong et al., 1998). This finding suggests that conscious visual 
perception of rivaling stimuli is still resolved in visual areas of the brain, but ones that lie 
outside the primary visual cortex. Thus, when it comes to examining the similarities between 
mental imagery and perception, perhaps it is more functionally relevant to consider the 
similarities between mental imagery and the perception in areas of the brain involved in the 
conscious perception of visual stimuli.  
     To this end, in one study, O’craven and Kanwisher (2000) investigated whether mental 
imagery of houses and faces involved content specific activation in extrastriate areas found to 
be selectively responsible for conscious perception of those stimuli.  They found that 
imagining faces and houses lead to content specific activation within the ventral ocipito-
temporal cortex called the fusiform face area and the ventromedial cortical region called the 
parahippocampal place area, respectively.  These findings dovetailed nicely with the known 
selectivity for visual stimuli of these kinds within those regions, and served as strong 
evidence that mental imagery recruits the same neural machinery of conscious visual 
perception in a content specific manner. Another fMRI study conducted in the same vein 
utilized multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA) of the BOLD signal to examine whether the 
brain encodes the content and location of imagined visual stimuli in the same manner as 
perceived visual stimuli. Multi-voxel pattern analysis examines the fine-grain patterns of 
activation in the brain over time associated with a given stimulus or condition to create 
classifiers based on those stimuli or conditions (Norman, Polyn, Detre, & Haxby, 2006). 
These classifiers are then applied to new BOLD data from a different set of conditions to 
determine whether they can significantly predict the pattern of activation above chance.  If 
they can, then the patterns of activation observed in the first set of data are reflected in the 
patterns of activation in the second (Norman et al., 2006). Thus, by having participants 
imagine seeing objects of different categories and in different spatial locations, and training 
classifiers on the brain activity from perceiving those objects from different spatial locations, 
Cichy et al. (2011) were able to determine whether the patterns of activity involved in the 
latter, could be used to predict brain activity of the former. They found that the classifiers 
trained on patterns of brain activity in response to visual stimuli of different categories (e.g., 
faces vs. houses) could significantly predict the patterns of activity in visual areas associated 
with perceiving those categories, and that the visual areas responsible for perceiving those 
categories maintained their category selectivity when imagining the stimuli (i.e., patterns of 
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activity in the occipital face are were significantly predicted by imagining faces, but not by 
imagining houses). Furthermore, they found that the patterns of activity associated with the 
spatial location of imagined visual stimuli could be predicted in early visual areas. Together, 
these neuroimaging experiments suggest that the content and spatial location of imagining 
visual stimuli and perceiving visual stimuli make use of overlapping neural mechanisms.  
     In summary, the neuroimaging evidence seems to suggest that mental imagery and 
perception rely on largely overlapping neural mechanisms. Moreover, it appears that 
imagining sensory stimuli can activate early sensory cortices, refuting the notion that mental 
imagery is propositional in nature, and supporting perception-based theories of imagery. 
Interestingly, however, all the research on the similarities between imagery and perception 
thus far have relied on demonstrating similarities within a single sensory modality (i.e., 
similarities between visual imagery and visual perception, or between auditory imagery and 
auditory perception) despite the fact that perception routinely involves the integration of 
sensory stimuli from several sensory modalities (Ghazanfar & Schroeder, 2006; Stein & 
Stanford, 2008). Thus, to truly examine whether mental imagery is perception-like, one must 
consider its relation to converging sensory information from other sensory modalities.  This is 
the aim of this thesis. In this next section I will discuss what is known about the multisensory 
nature of perception before outlining the aims of this thesis in more detail.   
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1.4 PERCEPTION AND MULTISENSORY INTEGRATION 
     As you walk the streets of a busy city during the day, you will see buildings, streets, cars, 
bicyclists, and fellow pedestrians; you will hear the cacophony of passing cars, bells of 
bicyclists, and the indistinct chatter of people around you; you will feel the wind, the sun, or 
the rain on your face, and perhaps the bump of a passing stranger. How is all of this 
information put together into a coherent perception of the world? How do we know which 
sights go with which sounds, or whether the bump we just felt was from a passing pedestrian, 
bicyclist, or car? Without some form of integration of these pieces of information, we would 
not be able to determine which sounds go with which objects we see, and the result would be, 
perceptually speaking, incomprehensible.  
     The proposed mechanism for how the brain solves this information-processing problem 
has been appropriately dubbed ‘multisensory integration’. Multisensory integration can be 
most generally defined as the effect that sensory stimuli from different sensory modalities 
have on an organism when they are combined rather than independent (Stein & Stanford, 
2008). In the case of human perception, this can take the form of an enhancement or 
hindrance of perception in one or more sensory modalities, as is the case in multisensory 
interactions (i.e., when one sensory modality effects the processing of another sensory 
modality).  Imagine the following: you are approached by a stranger on the bus while you are 
looking down at your feet (I don’t know why, maybe you just bought a pair of new shoes and 
you’re admiring how awesome your feet look in your new kicks—it’s just an example, so roll 
with it) minding your own business, when the stranger says something to you. You’re not 
quite sure what they said, but you think you heard them say, “are you going to take a dump?”, 
but that can’t be right. No. Even for public transportation, that is just too weird of a question 
(at least in most places: I’m looking at you San Francisco). So you politely look up from your 
amazing feet, and ask, “what’s that?” Then they begin to repeat themselves, but this time, as 
your gaze makes its way up to their face, a shiny button on their shirt distracts you, and you 
hear them repeat their question about your bowel movements. Still not convinced that a 
stranger could be asking you such a question, you look them directly in the face now and ask 
more directly, “what?!” They repeat the question, this time, with you looking directly at their 
lips as they speak, and now you hear it clearly: “Are you going to vote for Trump?” and all at 
once you realize that the button was a ‘Vote for Trump’ button, and you sincerely wish they 
asked you the other question. In this colorful example, your auditory perception was hindered 
every time you heard the question because of the noisy environment of the bus; however, 
once you looked at their mouth, violà! Your visual perception made what they said 
completely clear. In this case, your visual perception facilitated your auditory perception, but 
this could have been the other way around; your auditory perception could have facilitated 
your visual perception. Moreover, it could have been the case that your auditory perception 
was hindered by visual perception. Nevertheless, it is the interaction of the senses in this 
manner that we are discussing when we discuss multisensory interactions. In the case of 
multisensory integration, however, we are talking about the integration of sensory stimuli 
from two or more sensory modalities into a fused multisensory percept. That is, rather than 
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one sensory stimulus interacting or affecting the processing of stimuli in another sensory 
modality, the combination of two stimuli produces a fused, multisensory percept. Such would 
be the case in the example above if you heard someone say “bad” while you were watching 
the lip movements of the Trump supporter saying “gad” (whom, for the purpose of this 
example, you cannot hear at all), and you clearly hear “dad”, a fused multisensory percept of 
the heard and seen stimuli as a result of their integration. Below I will try to outline some of 
the key features within the large field of multisensory integration that are critical to this 
thesis. Because the studies contained within this thesis primarily examine multisensory 
integration and interactions of audiovisual stimuli, you will notice that I will mostly focus on 
the literature involving audiovisual stimuli. This is not to be taken as an indication that there 
is little research on the integration and interaction of different sensory modalities. Much to 
the contrary in fact, there is a vast and rich literature of the integration and interaction of other 
combinations; they just happen to fall outside the scope of this thesis.  
     Research on multisensory integration really starts to get going with findings by Alex 
Meredith and Barry Stein in the field of Neuroscience. Meredith and Stein (1983) were 
recording from individual neurons in the superior colliculus—a structure in the brain known 
to be involved in orientation towards sensory stimuli—of some of your favorite childhood 
pets (cats and hamsters) when they found cells with unique response properties. They found 
cells that not only responded to inputs from different senses (i.e., visual and auditory), but 
that responded more to the combination of visual and auditory stimuli than stimuli presented 
alone (Meredith & Stein, 1983). Although previous electrophysiology studies had found 
evidence of cells in the superior colliculus of mammals (Stein & Arigbede, 1972) and non-
mammals (Bastian, 1982) that respond to more than one kind of sensory stimulus this was the 
first evidence of what happens to the firing property of a cell in a more ecological context 
with more than one sensory input at a time (cf., Newman & Hartline, 1981) and seemed to 
provide a ostensible solution to the binding problem of perception (i.e., how it is that stimuli 
are combined from different senses to form perception). These findings would subsequently 
be expanded upon, and further experiments would uncover neurons with multisensory 
response properties in the cortex (i.e., outside the superior colliculus) of the cats (Wallace, 
Meredith, & Stein, 1992; Wallace, Stein, & Virginia, 1994), nonhuman primates (Bruce, 
Desimone, & Gross, 1981; Dahl, Logothetis, & Kayser, 2009; Perrodin, Kayser, Logothetis, 
& Petkov, 2014; Schroeder & Foxe, 2002) and humans (Calvert, Hansen, Iversen, & 
Brammer, 2001; Gentile, Petkova, & Ehrsson, 2011; Werner & Noppeney, 2010b).  
     In characterizing the response properties of multisensory neurons, researchers have come 
to develop several basic principles of the integration of multisensory stimuli (Stein & 
Stanford, 2008). The first is the temporal rule of multisensory integration, which states that 
cross-modal sensory stimuli are more optimally integrated if they occur at the same time. The 
second is the spatial rule, which, states that cross-modal stimuli are more optimally 
integrated if they occur in the same location. The third is the principle of inverse 
effectiveness, which states that the strength of the multisensory response is inversely 
proportional to the strength of the individual stimuli. That is, the weaker the stimuli are on 
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their own, the stronger the magnitude of the multisensory response when they are presented 
together. Lastly, another guiding principle is the so-called, ‘unity assumption’ rule, which 
states that in addition to the low-level spatial and temporal factors above, the strength of the 
multisensory response is related to the relationship of high-level features of those stimuli 
through prior experience (L. Chen & Vroomen, 2013; Vatakis & Spence, 2007). For 
example, hearing a dogs bark while seeing a cats mouth move would be less optimally 
integrated than hearing a dogs bark and seeing a dogs mouth move. These principles play an 
important role in a wide range of studies geared towards understating how we combine the 
onslaught of stimuli bombarding our senses at any given moment to form a coherent 
perception of the world.  
     In humans, the majority of studies characterizing the neural mechanisms of multisensory 
integration have been conducted using fMRI. Using various techniques, which manipulate the 
basic principles of multisensory integration described above, fMRI studies investigating the 
convergence of multisensory stimuli have identified the superior temporal sulcus (STS) as a 
key cortical region involved in the integration of auditory and visual stimuli (Beauchamp, 
Argall, Bodurka, Duyn, & Martin, 2004; Bonath et al., 2007; Bushara et al., 2003; Calvert, 
Campbell, & Brammer, 2000; Calvert, 2001; Marchant, Ruff, & Driver, 2011; Noesselt et al., 
2007; Stevenson & James, 2009). Studies investigating how we integrate seen and heard 
speech (Beauchamp, Nath, & Pasalar, 2010; Gibert, Fordyce, Nath & Beauchamp, 2012; 
Peelle, Eason, Schmitter, Schwarzbauer, & Davis, 2010; Stevenson & James, 2009; Wyk et 
al., 2010) as well as how we integrate seen and heard natural objects (e.g., a hammer hitting a 
nail) (Beauchamp, Lee, Argall, & Martin, 2004; Noesselt et al., 2007), and simple shapes and 
sounds on a computer screen (Driver & Noesselt, 2008; Marchant et al., 2011; Noesselt et al., 
2007), have all converged on the STS as a critical cortical region responsible for integrating 
these stimuli into a coherent percept. These findings have dovetailed nicely with 
electrophysiology and anatomical studies which have found neurons in the STS involved in 
multisensory integration in non-human primates (Bruce, Desimone, & Gross, 1981; Dahl, 
Logothetis, & Kayser, 2009; Perrodin, Kayser, Logothetis, & Petkov, 2014; Schroeder & 
Foxe, 2002). This is also consistent with anatomical studies on non-human primates which 
have found that this region receives direct projections from the auditory and visual cortices, 
making this the ideal candidate region for the integration of audiovisual stimuli (Kaas & 
Collins, 2004; Lyon & Kaas, 2002; Schroeder & Foxe, 2002; Seltzer & Pandya, 1994). Thus, 
the STS plays a pivotal role in the integration of auditory and visual stimuli, and will be of 
particular interest for our investigation of the neural mechanism involved in the integration of 
imagined visual and perceived auditory stimuli.  
     How does the integration of sensory stimuli effect perception? Some of the most dramatic 
examples of the perceptual consequences of multisensory integration can be readily observed 
in multisensory illusions.  Multisensory illusions are perceptual illusions that arise through 
the integration of two or more sensory stimuli. One such illusion is the cross-bounce illusion 
in which two moving visual objects which are normally perceived as passing-by one another, 
are perceived as colliding and bouncing off one-another when an auditory stimulus is 
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presented at the moment they meet (Sekuler, Sekuler, & Lau, 1997).  Consistent with the 
temporal principle of multisensory integration, the auditory stimuli presented at the moment 
the objects meet promotes the bounce percept much more than when auditory stimuli are 
presented before or after the objects meet.  Furthermore, a comparison of trials in which the 
objects were perceived as bouncing and trials in which the objects were perceived as crossing 
revealed increased BOLD responses in multisensory areas of the cortex, as well as in the 
superior colliculus in one fMRI experiment (Bushara et al., 2003).  Interestingly, this illusion 
can also be produced by presenting a tactile stimulus at the moment the objects meet or by 
briefly flashing visual stimulus at the moment the objects meet, leading some to speculate 
that this effect might merely be due to alterations in spatial attention (Shimojo & Shams, 
2001a). Further studies, however, have revealed that this illusion cannot be accounted for by 
attentional mechanisms alone (Grassi & Casco, 2009, 2012).  For example, it has been found 
that the content of the auditory stimulus affects whether we perceive the objects to bounce-off 
or cross-by one another, such that an auditory stimulus that reflects the typical acoustics of 
colliding objects (i.e., a damped auditory stimulus) produces the illusion, whereas the same 
sound played backwards (i.e., a ramped auditory stimulus) does not, even though the latter is 
perceived as louder and more perceptually salient than the former (Grassi & Casco, 2009). 
Furthermore, a signal detection analysis revealed that these auditory stimuli (i.e., damped and 
ramped) have the same effect on visual sensitivity in a visual detection task involving 
identical moving stimuli, suggesting that the effect cannot be explained by alterations in 
spatial attention alone (Grassi & Casco, 2009). 
     Another multisensory illusion that nicely demonstrates the perceptual consequences of 
multisensory integration is the ventriloquist effect. The ventriloquist effect gets its name from 
the classic act of stagecraft in which a puppeteer moves the mouth of a puppet while keeping 
his or her own mouth still, thereby shifting the perceived location of the puppeteers voice to 
the mouth of the puppet. In the study of multisensory integration, however, the ventriloquist 
effect refers to the translocation of auditory stimuli (usually simple tones) towards the 
perceived location of visual stimuli (usually simple flashes of light or briefly presented 
shapes) (Howard & Templeton, 1966; Wallace et al., 2004). Psychophysical behavioral 
experiments have revealed that the ventriloquism effect is the result of near optimal binding 
of audiovisual stimuli (Alais & Burr, 2004), and neuroimaging experiments investigating the 
neural substrates of the ventriloquism effect in humans have revealed the involvement of the 
STS in the ventriloquist effect (Bischoff et al., 2007), as well as dynamic changes in activity 
in the auditory cortex (Bonath et al., 2007); findings which correspond nicely with 
electrophysiology studies on non-human primates (Bruce et al., 1981; Kayser & Logothetis, 
2009; Seltzer & Pandya, 1994). Furthermore, researchers have found that repeated exposure 
to spatially disparate audiovisual stimuli can lead to plasticity of the auditory perceptual 
system causing observers to misperceive auditory stimuli in the direction of the previously 
related visual stimulus—a so called, ventriloquism aftereffect (Frissen, Vroomen, & de 
Gelder, 2012; Frissen, Vroomen, de Gelder, & Bertelson, 2005; Recanzone, 1998; Woods & 
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Recanzone, 2004; Wozny & Shams, 2011).  Thus, the ventriloquism illusion is a powerful 
tool for investigating the perceptual consequences of audiovisual integration.  
     The McGurk illusion is another important multisensory illusion that has been useful in 
furthering our understanding of multisensory integration. The McGurk illusion is an 
audiovisual speech illusion in which an auditory stimulus (e.g., /ba/) dubbed over videos of 
people silently articulating an incongruent speech stimulus  (e.g., /ga/) leads to an illusory 
fused auditory percept (e.g., /da/) (similar to the example described above). This illusory 
fused percept is the result of the compromise between the seen articulation in the video and 
the heard sound (McGurk & MacDonald, 1976). The benefit of this illusion for investigating 
multisensory integration, is that while normally the successful integration of what we hear 
and see during everyday speech perception goes unnoticed, in the McGurk illusion this same 
successful integration of what we hear and what we see leads to a very tangible change in 
auditory perception. Researchers can then manipulate various features of the auditory or 
visual stimuli to help us understand the underlying mechanisms of normal multisensory 
speech perception. Furthermore, consistent with other studies implicating the STS as a key 
region involved in integrating both speech and non-speech stimuli (Beauchamp, Argall, et al., 
2004; Calvert et al., 2000; Marchant et al., 2011; Noppeney, Josephs, Hocking, Price, & 
Friston, 2008; Perrodin et al., 2014; Stevenson & James, 2009; Szycik, Stadler, Tempelmann, 
& Münte, 2012; Werner & Noppeney, 2010a), neuroimaging experiments have found that the 
STS is critically involved in the McGurk illusion (Nath & Beauchamp, 2012; Szycik et al., 
2012), and that creating a temporary virtual lesion to this region using transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) severely disrupts the illusion (Beauchamp et al., 2010).   
     In the studies of this thesis, I have made use of the three multisensory illusions to 
determine whether (i) mental imagery can lead to changes in multisensory perception 
consistent with multisensory integration, (ii) whether these multisensory effects from 
imagined stimuli on perception follow the same temporal, spatial, and unity assumption 
principles as the real-stimulus versions of the illusions, and (iii) whether mental-imagery 
induced multisensory illusions are associated with the same neural processing as the 
integration of real audiovisual stimuli. This line of research is uncharted territory. Despite the 
abundance of research outlining the similarities between mental imagery and perception, 
whether mental imagery integrates with stimuli from a different sensory modality to change 
perception has never before been examined. Given how important the integration of sensory 
stimuli from our different sensory modalities is for perception, to understand mental imagery 
and its relationship to perception, we must consider its relationship to perception not just 
within a given sensory modality but also between them. The following sections will outline 
our modest attempt to do just that.  
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2 AIMS 
     The general aim of this thesis was to investigate what role, if any, mental imagery has in 
multisensory perception. More specifically, we sought to examine whether mental imagery is 
integrated with real sensory stimuli from a different sensory modality to change perception 
using behavioral and psychophysics techniques.  We also aimed to establish whether the 
integration of real and imagined cross-modal audiovisual stimuli is associated with activation 
in cortical areas related to the integration of real audiovisual stimuli using fMRI. 
2.1 STUDY I AIM 
• To examine whether mental imagery is capable of integrating with sensory stimuli 
from a different sensory modality to change multisensory perception in three different 
multisensory illusions.  
2.2 STUDY II AIM 
• To examine whether multisenory integation of real and imagiend sensory stimuli 
adheres to the ‘unity-assumption’ rule of multisensory integration, and also rule out 
possible alternative explanations for the imagery-induced cross-bounce illusion.  
2.3 STUDY III AIM 
• To investigate whether the cortical activation and connectivity patterns associated 
with the integration of imagined visual and real auditory stimuli in the imagery-
induced ventriloquist effect is the same as for the classical ventriloquist effect (i.e., 
with real auditory and real visual stimuli).  
2.4 STUDY IV AIM 
• To examine whether visual imagery can lead to short term cross-modal plasticity of 
auditory perception and change how we perceive auditory stimuli in the future.  
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3 METHODS 
3.1 PARTICIPANTS 
     All participants (n = 288) were recruited from the Stockholm student population, were 
screened for psychiatric or neurologic disorders, as well for any contradictions to the 
magnetic scanner in Study III, had normal hearing and vision (or corrected to normal with 
lenses). All participants gave their informed written consent at the outset of the experiment, 
and received monetary compensation in exchange for their participation at the conclusion of 
the experiment. All experiments were approved by the Regional Ethical Review Board of 
Stockholm and were conducted in accordance with the declaration of Helsinki.  
3.2 EXPERIMENTAL STIMULI  
     One of the great challenges of the studies contained within this thesis was setting up the 
experimental stimuli and apparatuses. Although the main theme of all the studies in this thesis 
revolved around whether mental imagery can integrate with cross-modal sensory stimuli, 
most of the experiments in each study had their own unique question to answer and therefore 
required their own unique stimuli specifically catered to each question. I will try to concisely 
summarize the key stimuli used for each experiment in Studies I-IV in this section.  
3.2.1 Stimuli for Study I 
     In Experiments 1A and 1B of Study I, we modified the original cross-bounce illusion 
setup (Sekuler et al., 1997) for our purposes. The visual stimuli consisted of two blue moving 
discs on a grey background on a 13-inch (33.02 cm) MacBook laptop screen. The discs 
(radius = 7.5 cm) moved diagonally 45° across the screen at a rate of 125 mm per second, 
crossing at the central fixation and disappearing off the screen in the opposite corner they 
came onto the screen. The auditory stimulus was a 200 ms beep sound, and the motor/tactile 
stimulus was a quick ≈200 ms finger tap with their index finger on the desk (with their palm 
facing downwards), or a ≈200 ms finger lift (the same movement as the finger tap, but with 
their palm facing upwards), which the participant imagined during the experiment, but heard 
or performed before the experiment began (although they actually heard the sound or 
performed the finger movement in the second half of Experiment 1B of Study I). The finger 
lift condition was strategically chosen in order to compare with the finger lift condition in 
Experiment 1A. Previous research has demonstrated that in addition to sounds, tactile 
stimuli can produce the cross-bounce illusion, thus we tested whether mental imagery of a 
motor movement which includes a strong tactile component (i.e., tapping the tip of the index 
finger against a surface) would also produce this effect when imagined at the moment of 
coincidence (Shimojo & Shams, 2001a). However, in order to control for the possibility that 
any increase perceived bounce was due to non-specific effects of mental imagery (e.g., 
modulation of attention or response bias), we included a condition with motor imagery almost 
identical to the finger tap but without the critical tactile event from tapping the tip of the 
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index finger (i.e., the finger lift condition) in Experiment 1B. All the stimuli that were not 
imagined were controlled using PsycoPy (Peirce, 2007, 2008). 
     In Experiments 2A and 2B of Study I, we made use of the ventriloquist illusion (Howard 
& Templeton, 1966). In this illusion auditory stimuli are translocated towards the 
simultaneously presented but spatially disparate visual stimuli. Thus, we presented auditory 
stimuli (a mixed 3000 Hz and 4000 Hz sine-wave tone; amplitudes = .5 N/m2) from 12 
different locations in Experiment 2A, and asked participants to localize the auditory stimuli 
as accurately as possible by clicking in the location where they heard a sound on a horizontal 
line spanned length of the visual display and appeared in the same vertical plane as the 
sounds. The auditory stimuli were pre-recorded binaurally using a dummy head (KU 100 
dummy head audio system; Neumann artificial head stereo) placed in the exact location the 
participants’ head would be during the experiment, and presented to the participants via 
headphones. Visual stimuli (white disc; radius = 9 cm) were imagined in four different 
locations (33.4 cm to the left or right of fixation and 79 cm to the left or right of fixation). 
Together, this resulted in the following stimulus combinations: auditory stimulus alone, 
visual imagery of a disc in the same location as the auditory stimulus, visual imagery of a 
disc in a location 15° away from the auditory stimulus, and visual imagery of a disc at a 
location 30° away from the auditory stimulus. Auditory stimuli presented in the auditory 
alone condition were presented from the same four locations as where the visual stimuli were 
imagined in the other conditions. In a separate experiment conducted at the conclusion of the 
imagery experiment, a real-stimulus version of the experiment was conducted that was 
identical to the imagery version of the experiment except that the visual stimuli were actually 
presented rather than imagined. All visual stimuli that were not imagined were projected onto 
the wall 79 cm in front of the participants from an overhead projector and controlled using 
PsyScope software (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993). 
     In Experiment 2B of Study I, we made use of a psychophysical staircasing procedure 
(Vroomen, Bertelson, & de Gelder, 2001).   Auditory stimuli were therefore presented from 
one of 41 possible locations (20 per hemifield and one at fixation) with the most distant 
sounds at 48°. As in Experiment 2A, all the auditory stimuli were pre-recorded binaurally 
using a dummy head placed in the exact location the participants would be tested during the 
experiment. The imagined visual stimulus was the same white disc as in Experiment 2A, and 
was imagined at fixation at the end of a countdown. Auditory stimuli were presented using 
the psychophysical staircase procedure during two counterbalanced conditions, and 
participants made binary judgments about the location of the stimuli (i.e., left or right). In one 
condition participants simply localized the auditory stimuli, in the other condition the 
participants imagined a visual stimulus flashing at the center of the screen at the same time 
they heard the auditory stimuli. All non-imagined stimuli for this experiment were controlled 
using PsychoPy software (Peirce, 2007, 2008). 
     In Experiment 3 of Study I, we made use of the McGurk illusion in which audiovisual 
stimuli combine to change auditory perception. In one classic version of the illusion, the 
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auditory speech stimulus /ba/ dubbed over video of someone (silently) articulating /ga/ leads 
to an illusory auditory speech percept /da/. Furthermore, congruent sounds (speech sounds 
which have a similar articulation) such as /ka/ are accurately perceived.  However, for our 
purposes, we modified this experiment so that participants imagined hearing the auditory 
stimuli while viewing the visual stimuli and asked them to report what they believed the 
person in the video was saying (i.e., da or ga).   The visual stimuli consisted of six different 
videos of different people articulating /ga/ three times at 40 bpm. The participants were 
trained, and then subsequently instructed to imagine hearing the auditory stimuli at the same 
rate following the end of a countdown.  The imagined auditory stimuli were the auditory 
speech stimuli /ba/ or /ka/. At the end of the experiment, the participant was tested for 
whether they perceived the classic McGurk illusion in a free response task that made use of a 
standard McGurk illusion video from the internet (example:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aFPtc8BVdJk). All stimuli during the experiment were 
controlled using PsyScope software (Cohen et al., 1993) on a 24-inch iMac computer.  
3.2.2 Stimuli for Study II 
     In Study II we made use of the cross-bounce illusion again; however, we made some 
changes to the visual and auditory stimuli compared to Experiment 1A and 1B in Study I. 
The visual stimuli consisted of two black discs (visual angle = .702°) moving diagonally at a 
45° angle (rate = 10.081°/s) from the top left and right corners of a white square on the screen 
(height = 15.095°, width = 15.095°).  We also manipulated the extent that the discs 
overlapped: the discs either overlapped 100% at the center of the screen (as in Study I), 
overlapped by 80%, or overlapped by 60% in the center of the screen. The different overlap 
conditions were achieved by removing the respective frames in which the discs overlapped 
by more than 80% or 60%. Importantly, the removed frames were added to the beginning and 
end of the to moving stimuli (not seen on-screen) in order to keep the speed and overall trial 
duration constant across all 3 overlap conditions. The auditory stimuli in this experiment 
consisted of a 200 ms damped auditory stimulus (i.e., harmonic complex tone, consisting of 
harmonics 1-10 of a 250 Hz fundamental for which the maximum amplitude was linearly 
decreased from ± 1 to 0 across its duration) or a ramped auditory stimulus (i.e., the same as 
the damped auditory stimulus but played in reverse). All visual and auditory stimuli that were 
not imagined were controlled using PsychoPy software (Peirce, 2007, 2008) on a 21.5-inch 
iMac computer at a viewing distance of 100 cm.  
3.2.3 Stimuli for Study III 
     Study III required special consideration concerning the stimuli and the procedures in 
order to adapt the ventriloquism paradigm to the unique environment of the scanner. The 
visual stimuli consisted of a white disc (20 mm) on a black background (as in Experiments 
2A and 2B, in Study I). During the main experiment the discs were imagined either 20° to 
the left or 20° to the right of the central fixation (0°); during functional localizer scans they 
were actually presented.  The visual stimuli were presented via MR-compatible LCD video 
goggles (NordicNeuroLab).  The auditory stimulus was a slightly shorter version (100 ms 
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duration) of the mixed tone used in Experiments 2A and 2B in Study I, played in mono-
mode via MR-compatible stereo headphones.  Thus, the auditory stimuli were generally 
perceived as spatially centered. Importantly, we chose to present the auditory stimuli in this 
manner for two reasons: First, we wanted to maximize the number of repetitions of all of the 
necessary conditions for the experiment within a reasonable amount of time (i.e., under 90 
minutes) and so we minimized the number of spatial locations of the auditory stimuli, and 
second we feared that the loud and noisy environment of the scanner would make precise 
localization of the auditory stimuli in different locations rather difficult, and therefore, 
behavioral measurements of the effect on auditory stimuli difficult to obtain across a small 
number of trials. Concerning the latter reason, there were two different methods of stimulus 
presentation in the literature for examining the neural correlates of ventriloquism, and so we 
chose the method of stimulus presentation in which auditory stimuli were presented centrally, 
and visual stimuli to the left or the right of fixation, because it fit best with our time and 
behavioral constraints (Bischoff et al., 2007; Bonath et al., 2007). Finally, in addressing our 
question concerning multisensory integration of imagined visual and perceived auditory 
stimuli, our key manipulation was the temporal relationship between the stimuli (i.e., auditory 
stimuli at the same or different time as the imagined visual stimuli) consistent with the 
temporal rule of multisensory integration (Stein & Stanford, 2008). For all critical 
comparisons and controls, there were seven different stimulus combinations in this 
experiment:  (1) imagined visual stimulus to the left at the same time as the auditory stimulus, 
(2) imagined visual stimulus to the right at the same time as the auditory stimulus, (3) 
imagined visual stimulus to the left at a different time as the auditory stimulus, (4) imagined 
visual stimulus to the right at a different time as the auditory stimulus, (5) imagine visual 
stimulus on the left without an auditory stimulus, (6) imagine visual stimulus on the right 
without an auditory stimulus, (7) hear auditory stimulus without imagining a visual stimulus. 
Each stimulus combination was presented six times (in 12 second blocks each). In functional 
localizer scans, the visual stimuli were actually presented to the participant rather than 
imagined in the same stimulus combinations described above. All the stimuli that were not 
imagined were controlled using PsychoPy software (Peirce, 2007, 2008) on a 13-inch 
Macbook computer within a control room.  
3.2.4 Stimuli for Study IV 
     In Study IV we examined whether imagined visual stimuli can lead to changes in future 
auditory perception after repeated exposure to synchronous but spatially disparate imagined 
visual and real auditory stimuli. Thus, this experiment makes use of the imagery-induced 
ventriloquism effect to investigate whether there is an aftereffect on auditory perception (i.e., 
a ‘ventriloquism aftereffect’). Thus, the visual stimuli consisted of a white disc on a black 
background. The auditory stimuli consisted of 50 ms white noise bursts. White noise bursts 
were chosen over other kinds of sounds (such as the tones used in Study I and Study III) in 
light of previous studies demonstrating very rapid recalibration of auditory stimuli from 
visual stimuli (Wozny & Shams, 2011). The auditory stimuli in Experiment 1A and 
Experiment 1B of this study were presented from one of five locations (±8°, ±16°, and 0°) 
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from self-amplified monitors arranged in a semicircular orientation along the azimuth on a 
shelf behind acoustically transparent fabric. The fabric was visually opaque, however, and the 
visual stimuli were projected onto the fabric from an overhead projector. In the test phase, 
auditory stimuli were presented either 8° to the left of fixation, 8° to the right of fixation, or at 
fixation in counterbalanced blocks. In all blocks, the participants imagined the visual stimulus 
appearing at 0° at the same time as the auditory stimulus. During the test phases, the 
participants heard the auditory stimuli come randomly form one of the 5 locations described 
above and pressed whether they heard the sound come from the left or the right. In 
Experiments 2A and 2B, however, we wanted to examine whether any observed effects on 
auditory perception were frequency specific. The rationale for these experiments were in line 
with previous research on the ventriloquism aftereffect which has found that the aftereffect 
does not transfer across disparate frequencies (Frissen et al., 2005; Recanzone, 1998; Woods 
& Recanzone, 2004). Thus, the auditory stimulus presented in the exposure phase for 
Experiments 2A and 2B of Study IV was a 50 ms 4 kHz sine-wave auditory stimulus. The 
auditory stimulus used in the test phase of these experiments was the same as in 
Experiments 1A and 1B of Study IV. In Experiments 1B and 2B, the visual stimuli were 
actually presented (rather than imagined) for comparison with any imagery-induced effects. 
All stimuli in Study IV were controlled using PsychoPy software (Peirce, 2007, 2008) on a 
24-inch iMac computer.  
3.3 IMAGERY INSTRUCTIONS 
     Another very important methodological consideration for these experiments is how the 
participants were instructed to imagine the stimuli during these experiments. Because our 
main question concerning the integration of mental imagery and perception in these studies 
hinged on the participants being able to imagine specific auditory (Study I & II), visual 
(Study I, III, & IV), or tactile/motor (Study I) stimuli at precise moments in time and space, 
careful consideration was given to how participants were instructed to imagine these stimuli. 
At the outset of each experiment (Studies I-IV), the participants were shown (if visual), 
heard (if auditory), or performed (if tactile/motor) the stimulus or stimuli they were to 
imagine during that experiment. This was repeated as needed, until the participant indicated 
that they felt they were familiar enough with the stimulus that they could remember it and 
form a clear mental image of it in their mind. Because it was critical that participants imagine 
the stimuli at a precise time and/or location, temporal and/or spatial cues were used during the 
experiments. 
3.3.1 Imagery Instructions for Experiments in Study I 
     In Experiments 1A and 1B, and Experiments 1A and 2 in Study I & II, respectively on 
the cross-bounce illusion, the participants made use of the moving discs to time their mental 
imagery of the specified stimulus. In Experiments 1A & 1B of Study I a cue prior to each 
trial instructed the participants which stimulus to imagine (i.e., auditory or motor/tactile) and 
when during that trial (500 ms before the discs met, at the moment they met, 500 ms after the 
discs met) or instructed them to simply view the discs. Specifically, the participants saw 
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instructions appear on the screen for 2 s prior to the start of each trial indicating what to 
imagine and where. The instructions were as follows: “imagine sound here”, “imagine 
moving finger here”, “view only”, for conditions in which the participants imagined the 
sound, the finger movements, or simply viewed the visual stimuli, respectively. The auditory 
and motor/tactile stimuli were first heard and performed several times before the start of the 
experiment.  Importantly, for the motor/tactile stimuli the participants had their hand on the 
table, performed the action several times before the start of the experiment, and were 
instructed to imagine moving their finger in that exact manner when cued to “imagine 
moving finger here”.  For all imagery conditions, the location of the text indicated at which 
point during the motion of the discs the participants should imagine the stimulus. That is if 
the “imagine sound here” was placed above the central fixation prior to a trial, the participant 
knew that they would imagine hearing the auditory stimulus 500 ms before the discs met in 
the center of the screen, whereas if the “imagine sound here” was placed at the fixation prior 
to the trial, the participant would imagine hearing the auditory stimulus at the moment the 
discs met.  
     In the ventriloquism Experiments 2A and 2B in Study I, the timing and the location of 
the imagined visual stimulus was very important.  For this reason, the participants saw the 
visual stimulus they should imagine on a particular trial in the location where they should 
imagine it, prior to the trial.  At the outset of the experiment, the participants were instructed 
that they should imagine this visual stimulus as vividly as possible, and in the exact location 
they saw it appear, at the end of a countdown. Next, a countdown from 3 began at the central 
fixation. At the end of the countdown, the participant imagined the visual stimulus in the 
appropriate location as vividly as possible, but while maintaining fixation in the center of the 
screen. On trials for which the participants did not need to imagine a visual stimulus no cue 
was presented prior to the countdown.  
     In Experiment 3 in Study I the experiment was split into blocks of trials in which the 
participants were instructed to imagine hearing either /ba/ or /ka/ three times at a specific 
pace (40 bpm) at the end of a countdown.  A metronome was used to allow participants to 
practice their timing before the start of the experiment. The countdown was also presented at 
the rate of 40 bpm, and so the participant was instructed to imagine the auditory stimulus in 
continuation of the beat of the countdown. At the same time, they imagined the auditory 
stimuli, a video of someone silently articulating /ga/ appeared on the screen with their mouth 
movements synchronized to the beat of the countdown. At the conclusion of the video, the 
participant was then asked to indicate their perception of what they thought the person in the 
video was articulating.  
3.3.2 Imagery Instructions for Study II 
     In Study II the participants always imagined the auditory stimulus at the moment the discs 
met but were instructed which auditory stimulus (i.e., damped, ramped, or no auditory 
stimulus) to imagine before each block of trials. The block order was counterbalanced across 
participants. The participants heard both auditory stimuli at the outset of the experiment in 
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order to establish that they could hear the difference between them. There were two reasons 
for exposing the participants to both stimuli in the beginning of the experiment: (1) classic 
versions of the experiment did not have this block design, and so participants would have 
been exposed to the ramped and damped sound on a trial-by-trial basis, and (2) we were 
concerned that the stimuli were too similar and wanted to verify that the participants heard 
the difference between them (and would therefore, be able to imagine the correct stimulus 
during the experiment). Furthermore, we were confident that if this early exposure to the 
stimuli were to bias the participants’ responses during the experiment it would make itself 
clear in as a lack of variation in the perception of bounce across the three overlap conditions 
(i.e., we would see no difference between the three overlap conditions for a given sound). We 
chose a block design because we feared that participants would be confused about which 
sound was which if we had instructed them to imagine the stimuli on a trial-by-trial basis. 
Before each block, the sound the participants were to imagine during that block was played 
repeatedly until they had a good memory for the sound and felt they could accurately and 
vividly imagine it throughout the experiment.  
3.3.3 Imagery Instructions for Study III 
     In Study III in fMRI-adapted version of the imagery-induced ventriloquism illusion, the 
participants imagined the visual stimuli while in the scanner. They were first given general 
instructions as to what the stimuli would look like, and what they would need to do. The 
participants were given a practice session with one trial of each of the possible stimulus 
combinations during the calibration scans. This was done in the scanner in order to make sure 
the participant was familiar with the task while in the scanner, and so that they could 
acclimate themselves to the task with noise of the scanner. For this experiment, the 
participants were familiarized with the visual stimulus (white disc on a black ba) and the 
auditory stimulus (100 ms sine-wave mixed tone presented in mono-mode over headphones; 
perceived spatially as coming from 0°) they would have to imagine during the functional 
localizer scans. However, in order to cue the participant to the location and the timing that 
they should imagine the stimulus (60 bpm) during the imagery portions of the experiment, 
they saw an instruction appear below the central fixation instructing them whether they 
should imagine the visual stimulus or the auditory stimulus, “imagine circle” or “imagine 
sound”, respectively. A countdown from three appeared at the same time as the imagery 
instruction, in the location that the participant should imagine the visual stimulus on that trial 
(i.e., 20° to the left of fixation, or 20° to the right of fixation). The countdown appeared in the 
central fixation before the imagine auditory stimulus trials.  Following the countdown, in the 
same beat as the countdown, the participants imagined the respective stimulus as vividly as 
possible. The stimulus combinations were constructed around this basic setup, such that the 
imagery task was always to imagine the respective stimulus, in the specified location, at the 
specified timing (following the countdown), and the auditory stimuli were presented in 
synchrony or asynchrony with the participants imagery (during imagine circle trials; no visual 
or auditory stimulus was presented when they imagined the auditory stimulus).  
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3.3.4 Imagery Instructions for Study IV 
     In Study IV we simplified the imagery task for the participants considerably. Much like 
Study III, this experiment required that the participants imagine a visual stimulus repeatedly 
at a specific rate for an extended period of time. In Study IV, this was because we wanted to 
examine whether auditory adaptation occurred in response to repeated exposure to 
synchronous but spatially discrepant auditory and imagined visual stimuli. Thus, the 
participants had to imagine the visual stimuli once per second (60 bpm) for 30 s exposure 
periods). In order to cue the participant to the location and timing of the to-be-imagined 
visual stimulus (although the location always remained the same), the participant saw a 
countdown from 5 appear just above the central fixation. After 4 in the countdown, from 3 to 
1, the participant saw the white disc they were to imagine flash on the screen at the central 
fixation (although the fixation cross disappeared at 4 in the countdown) at the same pace as 
the countdown and the same rate that the participant should imagine the visual stimulus. The 
participant then imagined the visual stimulus flashing as vividly as possible once per second 
for 100 ms in the same manner they saw it flashing from 3-1 in the countdown for the 
duration of the exposure period. At the end of the exposure period a red fixation-cross 
appeared on the screen informing the participant that they should stop imagining the visual 
stimulus. Thus, for our key manipulation the auditory stimuli were presented to the left of, the 
right of, or at fixation at the same time the participants were imagining the visual stimuli 
(following the rhythm, and at the same rate as the countdown) during the exposure phase. 
3.4 PSYCHOPHYSICAL TECHNIQUES  
     In Study I, Study II, and Study IV we systematically varied some aspect of the stimuli 
that the participants were reporting in an attempt to strengthen our conclusions by examining 
changes in perception of the stimuli that would be very difficult (if not impossible) to explain 
by response bias or tacit knowledge. 
     In Experiment 2B of Study I following the methodology of Bertelson and Ascherleben 
(1998) we made use of a psychophysical staircaising procedure in which the location of the 
auditory stimulus was systematically varied as participants made simple judgments about 
whether the sound came from the left of the right. The ‘staircase’ procedure involves starting 
at one extreme of the stimulus extremes (i.e., 48° to the left or right) and gradually moving 
the location of the stimulus towards the center one step at a time as participants make correct 
responses.  Sounds starting on the left and moving towards the center are referred to as the 
left staircase, and sounds starting at the right and moving towards the center are referred to as 
the right staircase. During the experiment, sounds from the left and right staircase are 
randomly selected. Eventually, as the participant continues to make correct responses, the 
sounds move closer to the center, and at a certain point the participant can no longer 
distinguish between sounds on the left or the right. When participants make a mistake, the 
auditory stimulus moves back one step in the staircase (i.e., in the opposite direction as the 
previous auditory stimulus in that staircase), if they make a correct response, the auditory 
stimulus moves one step closer to the center (and even past the central fixation and into the 
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other hemifield if necessary).  From the first mistake, however, we begin counting the 
number of response reversals—a response that was different than the previous response—
until the participant has made 8 such reversals. If auditory stimuli are translocated towards 
imagined visual stimuli, then we should see imagined visual stimuli cause the reversals to 
happen earlier in the staircase (i.e., when the auditory stimuli were further away from the 
center) and the staircases should converge towards the center more slowly. Thus, we 
employed the staircasing procedure under two conditions: one in which the participants 
imagined a visual stimulus in the center of the screen at the same moment that they heard 
each sound, and one in which they did not imagine the visual stimulus. An estimate of the 
region of uncertainty (i.e., the area in which the participant could not distinguish between left 
and right sounds) can then be calculated as the average distance between the left and right 
staircases on the 8 reversals (i.e., responses that were different than the previous response in 
that staircase). In this paradigm we predict that the area of uncertainty should be significantly 
larger when participants imagined the visual stimulus than when they did not on the basis of 
previous studies using this paradigm for real visual stimuli (Bertelson & Aschersleben, 1998; 
Bertelson, 2000). Importantly, this procedure obviates concerns that the participants are 
adjusting their responses to please the experimenter (response bias) or basing their responses 
(even without their knowledge) on tacit knowledge about the purpose of the experiment, as 
there is no clear response pattern from the vantage point (explicit or implicit) of the 
participant which would ideally conform to either the hypothesis nor alternative hypothesis 
without careful consideration on the part of the participant. Particularly when one considers 
that the experiment did not end until the participant made 8 responses one each staircase that 
was different than the previous. Without the participant knowing which staircase they were 
on (left or right) and which response they had given on that staircase previously, it would 
have been impossible to systematically or tacitly alter their response for or against the 
hypothesis without the experimenter’s knowledge.  
     In Experiments 1A, 1B and 2, in Study II we manipulated the extent that the moving 
discs overlap (100%, 80%, or 60%) at the center of the screen, and thus, how much they 
appeared to bounce-off one another, in the cross-bounce illusion. The extent that the discs 
overlap alters the perception of whether they bounce or not because truly bouncing objects 
never completely overlap. Thus, the 60% overlap condition, should be the most ‘bounce-like’ 
and the 100% overlap the least ‘bounce-like’. This manipulation as chosen on the basis of 
previous work on the cross-bounce illusion (Grassi & Casco, 2009, 2012). The most 
important feature of this manipulation is that it would indirectly serve to rule out any effect of 
response bias for our imagined sound manipulation (i.e., damped and ramped sounds) by 
making it unclear to the participant what the ideal response strategy would be across trials in 
order to conform to the experimental hypothesis.  That is, the results of Experiment 1A or 
1B could rule out such implicit or explicit response biases. For instance, if the results 
indicated that the damped sound increased the perception of bounce approximately the same 
amount across all overlap conditions, or that the ramped sound decreased or did not change 
across all levels of the overlap conditions, then this would reveal a response bias on the part 
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of the participant. That is, they thought that when they imagined the damped sound, they 
should say they saw the discs bounce rather than cross, and when they heard the ramped 
sound, they should say the sounds crossed rather than bounced on average. However, if the 
effects were truly perceptual in nature, we should see that the proportion of bounce responses 
in the ramped and damped sound conditions scales with the overlap conditions (which is 
indeed what we find).  Furthermore using this paradigm, we were able to use signal detection 
analysis to explicitly test whether there was a systematic change in sensitivity to the visual 
stimuli (i.e., attentional mechanism), or response bias pattern associated with imagining the 
auditory stimuli at the moment the discs met in the center, in a separate experiment. To this 
end, in accordance with previous studies (Grassi & Casco, 2009), we had participants report 
whether the discs overlapped or not on each trial, keeping all other aspects of the experiment 
identical. In this way, if one or both of the visual stimuli caused a change or shift in attention 
(as measured by the sensitivity index d´ here) or response bias (captured by c here) we would 
be able to measure it. In order to calculate the sensitivity index d´ and response bias c, the 
participants’ responses were first coded as hits (i.e., partially overlapping response was given 
for partially overlapping display), misses (i.e., fully overlapping response given on partially 
overlapping display), correct rejections (i.e., fully overlapping response was given for a fully 
overlapping display), and false alarms (i.e., partially overlapping response was given for a 
fully overlapping display.  We were then able to calculate the Hit and False alarm rates as 
follows: Hit rate = Hits/(Hits+Misses), and False-Alarm (FA) rate = FA/(FA+Correct-
Rejections), repectively, for each participant, for the 60% and 80% overlap displays for each 
imagery condition (i.e., imagine ramped sound or imagined damped sound). The sensitivity 
index d´ [d'= Φ–1 (Hit rate) – Φ–1 (FA rate)] and the response bias index c [c = − (Φ–1 (Hit 
rate) + Φ–1  (FA rate))/2] were then calculated. In this formulation, positive perceptual 
sensitivity values would indicate better performance on the visual discrimination task, and 
negative values on the response bias index c should indicate a bias towards the ‘partially 
overlapping’ response. We correct for infinite values—a common occurrence in signal 
detection analyses—using the 1/(2N) rule (Hautus, 1995; Macmillan & Kaplan, 1985). Thus, 
these values would reveal whether imagining a damped compared to ramped sound led to 
systematic changes in visual attention or response bias that could perhaps explain the 
observed effects of our main experiment on whether damped compared to ramped sounds 
altered the perceived motion of visual stimuli. We predicted that imagining a ramped and 
damped sounds could reduce sensitivity compared to the view only condition, due to attention 
load (Alais, van Boxtel, Parker, & van Ee, 2010; Watanabe & Shimojo, 1998), but predicted 
that there should be no significant differences between damped and ramped sound on 
sensitivity or response bias indices. Such differences would be predicted by alternative, 
response bias or attentional mechanisms. Thus, together, this study was uniquely designed to 
confirm or rule out alternative accounts of this imagery-induced multisensory illusion.  
     In Study IV we were interested in whether there was a shift in auditory perception 
following exposure to spatially disparate imagined visual and real auditory stimuli. Thus, we 
systematically varied the spatial location of the auditory following exposure periods, in order 
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to obtain an estimate of each participant’s point of subjective equality (PSE) for the different 
adaptation locations (i.e., imagined visual stimulus to the left of the auditory stimulus, 
imagined visual stimulus to the right of the auditory stimulus, or imagined visual stimulus in 
the same location as the auditory stimulus). The PSE refers to the location at which the 
participants can no longer distinguish between auditory stimuli from the left or the right in 
this study. The participants made binary (left or right) responses to indicate the perceived 
location of the auditory stimuli following the exposure periods. One key feature of this 
paradigm is that the visual stimulus was always imagined in the center of the screen, with the 
auditory stimuli presented to the left, right or same location. This meant that from the outset, 
the effect we were interested in was in the opposite direction of what lay intuition, tacit 
knowledge, or response bias would predict. That is, if the participant noticed the discrepancy 
between the visual and auditory stimulus during the exposure periods, they would surely 
think that they should respond more in the direction of that they heard the auditory stimulus 
when making their responses in the test phase.  However, the predicted adaptation effect is in 
the opposite direction: we predicted that the participants should perceive sounds to come 
more from the left following exposure periods where the visual stimulus was imagined in the 
center and the auditory stimulus was heard on the right (and vise versa for auditory stimuli 
presented on the left of the imagined visual stimuli in the center). This stimulus setup also 
had the added benefit of making it easier for the participants to imagine the visual stimuli 
consistently throughout the experiment. The PSEs were calculated by first fitting a logistic 
regression curve to the participants’ responses across the different auditory locations, and 
then calculating spatial location that corresponded to the 50% probability of a ‘rightward’ 
response.  The PSEs for each adaptation condition (leftward adaptation, rightward adaptation, 
same location adaptation) were calculated for each participant individually and then 
compared across participants at the group level.  
3.5  FMRI: METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
     Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) is a highly versatile neuroimaging 
technique with vast clinical and research applications. The benefits of using fMRI for 
research applications are that it enables us to measure activity of the entire brain non-
invasively in live and awake humans engaged in a variety of behavioral and cognitive tasks. 
The activity measured in fMRI is the blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) response, which 
takes advantage of the hemodynamics associated with neural activation. When neurons fire in 
a particular region in the brain, glucose and oxygen are metabolized in that region, leading to 
increased blood flow, and with it, oxygenated hemoglobin (Brown, Perthen, Liu, & Buxton, 
2007; Logothetis & Wandell, 2004; Logothetis, 2008). A radio-frequency coil around the 
participants head then measures the subsequent change in the otherwise uniform magnetic 
field that results from the influx of oxygenated hemoglobin (Brown et al., 2007). This 
imaging technique has been extremely useful in investigating the neural correlates of a wide 
variety of behavioral, cognitive, and emotional processes.  However, fMRI also has its 
drawbacks. In this section, I will briefly touch upon some of the methodological drawbacks 
of fMRI and the things we have done to try to get the most out of this technique despite them.   
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     One methodological consideration in fMRI is head movement. Unfortunately, both the 
quality of the scans and the functional inferences that are to be made on them are highly 
susceptible to head movement (Khanna, Altmeyer, Zhuo, & Steven, 2015; Yendiki, 
Koldewyn, Kakunoori, Kanwisher, & Fischl, 2014). For this reason, the participants were 
instructed and reminded throughout the experiment to keep their head as still as possible. 
Further precautions were taken to keep their head in place during the scanning by carefully 
packing their head into the radio frequency (RF) head coil with padding. Some movement, 
however, is unavoidable despite all of these precautions; therefore, further offline corrections 
for head movement are made. The offline-processing and statistical analysis of the fMRI data 
was handled using SPM 8 (Statistical Parametric Mapping, Wellcome Center for 
Neuroimaging) and Matlab (The MathWorks Inc., Natick, MA, USA). The functional images 
are first visually inspected for movement artifacts. If artifacts are found, then that participant 
or that run can be thrown out (no such artifacts were discovered in our data set, however). 
Further inspection of the data for head motion was then conducted using the Artifact 
Detection Toolbox (ART)(Massachusetts Institutet of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA), 
which searches for signal intensity and movement artifacts in the fMRI images. Next, the 
images are re-aligned to compensate for any head-movement during each run of the 
experiment. Following image re-alignment (and other pre-processing of the data, such as 
normalization to MNI space, reslicing, and smoothing) the detected artifacts from ART can 
then be used as nuisance regressors in the general linear model (GLM) in addition to the x, y, 
and z movement parameters to covary out movement related confounders.  
     In using fMRI we to investigate the neural correlates of the imagery-induced 
ventriloquism, much of what we are interested in, is where in the brain multisensory specific 
activation occurs. However, each person’s brain is slightly different in size and shape, and so 
making anatomical generalizations at the group level requires that we place all the brains into 
the same coordinate space. For this reason, we take a high-resolution anatomical scan of each 
participant’s brain and then co-register the functional images to that participant’s anatomical 
scan. Furthermore, so that we can make inferences across participants, the anatomical and 
functional images are warped into Montreal Neurological Institutet (MNI) standard space. 
This standard coordinate space also allows us to make comparisons across experiments.  
     Our key experimental question was centered on whether the imagined visual and real 
auditory stimuli led to multisensory integration, and therefore, whether the imagery-induced 
ventriloquism effect was associated with activity in key multisensory regions. However, there 
are many ways to characterize multisensory integration in neuroimaging. Common analysis 
techniques for characterizing multisensory responses in neuroimaging include the criterion of 
the mean, whereby the observed activation is greater than the average of the responses to the 
sensory stimuli alone; the criterion of the maximum, whereby the observed activation is 
greater than the maximum response to a single sensory stimulus; or the criterion of 
superadditivity, whereby the activation observed is greater than the sum of the responses to 
all sensory stimuli presented alone (Calvert & Thesen, 2004; Laurienti, Perrault, Stanford, 
Wallace, & Stein, 2005; Stein & Stanford, 2008; Wallace et al., 2004). However, one 
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problem the lesser stringent criteria (criterion of the mean or criterion of the maximum) is 
that, in contrast to electrophysiology, the spatial resolution of fMRI (i.e., 2 x 2 x 2 mm voxel 
size, smoothed with an 8 mm full-width-at-half-maximum isotropic Gaussian kernel in our 
experiment) cannot rule out that the responses to multisensory stimuli merely reflects the 
activation of unisensory neurons in the same area, rather than reflecting the response of 
multisensory neurons which serve to integrate cross-modal stimuli.  The problem with the 
more stringent criterion (the criterion of superadditivity) is that (a) it this analysis may reveal 
superadditive responses by summing positive and negative activations, such that rather than 
finding regions responsive to stimuli from different sensory modalities, superadditivity is 
found because an activation occurs in the presence of one stimulus and is suppressed below 
baseline in another, and (b) even if these concerns are accounted for, this criterion may be too 
stringent as there are multisensory neurons that do have linear subadditive response profiles, 
and therefore, lead to an increase in false negatives (Calvert & Thesen, 2004; Laurienti et al., 
2005).  However, in these concerns can be obviated by systematically manipulating the 
conditions under which two sensory stimuli are likely to be combined (Calvert & Thesen, 
2004).  This method has the added benefit of controlling for any possible effects of attention 
as the same stimuli are presented in both conditions; only their relationship has changed.  In 
our experiment, we have made use of the temporal rule of multisensory integration to avoid 
these concerns, by manipulated the temporal relationship between the imagined visual and 
real auditory stimulus (i.e., presented synchronously or asynchronously). Any resulting 
differences in activation should thusly reflect the multisensory integration of these stimuli. 
     Lastly, further consideration for inferences about fMRI concerns what we can and cannot 
infer from the fMRI signal.  For all its benefits, fMRI is unavoidably correlative in its relation 
to neural activity. As stated above, the activation observed in fMRI is the BOLD response, 
and is related to the hemodynamics associated with neural activation, not neural activity 
itself. Work examining the extent to which the BOLD response is indicative of neural signals 
using simultaneous fMRI and intracortical electrophysiology recordings have found that the 
hemodynamic response does indeed seem to closely reflect neural activity, and seems to most 
closely reflect local field potentials (Logothetis, Pauls, Augath, Trinath, & Oeltermann, 2001; 
Logothetis & Wandell, 2004). Nevertheless, one must keep in mind the correlative nature of 
the technique, and the many levels removed we are from measuring what we truly wish to 
measure (i.e., neural activity).  As for our part, we have done our best to keep in mind the 
correlative nature of the BOLD signal in interpreting our results, and where possible we have 
couched our findings within a framework that takes into account the underlying 
neurophysiology.  
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4 OVERVIEW OF STUDIES     
4.1 STUDY I: MENTAL IMAGERY CHANGES MULTISENSORY PERCEPTION 
4.1.1 Study I Background and Rationale 
     In light of previous research on the similarities between mental imagery and perception 
described above, Study I was really a series of experiments designed as a proof of concept 
for the multisensory integration of real an imagined stimuli. Thus, we made use of classic 
versions of multisensory illusions, adapted for this purpose by having participants imagine a 
stimulus in one sensory modality and measuring their perception of the other sensory 
modality.  
     In the first two experiments (Experiments 1A & 1B) we made use of the cross-bounce 
illusion in which an auditory stimulus presented at the moment two passing stimuli meet 
promotes the illusory perception that they bounce-off, rather than cross-by one another. For 
our purposes, the participants imagined the auditory stimulus. Consistent with classic findings 
on the cross-bounce illusion (Sekuler et al., 1997), as well as the temporal rule of 
multisensory integration (Stein & Stanford, 2008), we predicted that, imagining an auditory 
stimulus at the moment two discs meet would promote this illusory bounce percept compared 
to when the auditory stimulus was imagined before, or after the objects met, or not imagined 
at all. Furthermore, we also included an additional finger-tap condition at the moment the 
discs met, in which the participants imagined tapping their finger at the moment the discs 
met. Consistent with previous studies demonstrating that the cross-bounce illusion can be 
elicited by tactile events we predicted that imagining a finger tap at the moment of 
coincidence would also produce the illusion because of the dynamic tactile feedback from the 
fingertip.  In a control experiment (Experiment 1B) we included condition in which the 
participants imagined a finger-lift—the same movement as in the finger tap condition, but 
importantly, without the tactile component—at the moment of coincidence. In contrast to the 
finger tap condition of Experiment 1A, we predicted that the finger lift condition should not 
produce the illusion, despite the fact that both conditions demand the same amount of 
attention and involve very similar kinds of motor imagery.  
     In two additional experiments (Experiments 2A & 2B) we made use of a different 
multisensory illusion—the ventriloquist effect—to examine whether imagined visual stimuli 
could integrate with real auditory stimuli to change auditory perception. In the classic 
ventriloquism paradigm, a visual stimulus presented at the same time, but different location 
than an auditory stimulus leads to a translocation of auditory perception towards the visual 
stimulus. Thus, for our purposes, we had participants imagine a visual stimulus at the same 
time as a spatially disparate auditory stimulus and measured their auditory perception. We 
predicted that imagining a visual stimulus in a different location than an auditory stimulus 
would lead to a translocation of auditory stimuli away from their veridical source, and that 
imagining a visual stimulus in the same location as an auditory stimulus would improve 
auditory localization compared to when auditory stimuli were presented alone. This result 
C.C. Berger    Where Imagination Meets Sensation  
 
  42 
would be consistent with studies using real audiovisual stimuli in the classic ventriloquism 
illusion (Alais & Burr, 2004; Howard & Templeton, 1966). In Experiment 2B we made use 
of a psychophysical staircase procedure in an experiment designed to rule out non-perceptual 
accounts if the imagery-induced ventriloquism illusion.  
     Finally, in a third experiment (Experiment 3), we made use of yet another classic 
multisensory illusion—the McGurk illusion—to examine whether auditory imagery could 
lead to cross-modal changes in speech perception. In the classic McGurk illusion, certain 
incongruent auditory speech stimuli (e.g., /ba/) dubbed over visual speech stimuli (e.g., /ga/) 
lead to an illusory auditory speech percept (e.g., /da/) compared to congruent auditory speech 
stimuli (e.g., /ka/)(McGurk & MacDonald, 1976). Thus, in this experiment, we predicted that 
imagining hearing /ba/ at the moment participants were seeing someone silently articulate 
/ga/ would promote the illusory perception that the person articulating /ga/ was articulating 
/da/, compared to when they imagined hearing the congruent auditory stimulus /ka/ or simply 
viewed the person articulating /ga/. This finding would be further evidence of the cross-
modal influence of auditory imagery on visual perception, and would be consistent with the 
so-called ‘reverse-McGurk’ illusion whereby real auditory speech stimuli have been shown to 
change visual shape perception (Charles Spence & Deroy, 2012; Sweeny, Guzman-Martinez, 
Ortega, Grabowecky, & Suzuki, 2012). 
4.1.2 Study I Results and Conclusions 
     Consistent with our hypothesis, in Experiment 1A of Study I we found that imagining an 
auditory stimulus at the moment the two discs met significantly promoted the illusory 
perception that the discs bounced-off rather than crossed-by one another, compared to when 
the participants imagined an auditory stimulus before or after the discs met, or when they 
were simply viewing the discs (Figure 4A). As expected, we found that imaging the finger 
tap at the moment the discs met also promoted the illusory bounce percept. Importantly, 
however, in Experiment 1B of Study I we found that imagining a finger lift—i.e., a 
movement like the finger tap movement in Experiment 1A but without the dynamic tactile 
percept from the tip of the finger—at the moment the discs met did not promote the illusory 
bounce percept compared to simply viewing the discs.  Experiment 1B also replicated the 
effect for imagining a sound at the moment the discs met on the perception of the bounce 
percept. These results were consistent with those from a subsequent ‘real-stimulus’ version of 
the experiment in which the participants actually moved their finger or heard a sound at the 
moment the discs met (see Figure 4B).  
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Figure 4. Visual Bounce-Illusion from imagining sounds. The results from Experiment 1A (A) 
and Experiment 1B (B) from Study I.  Experiment 1A (A) demonstrated that imagining a sound at 
the moment the discs met, compared to before or after, or not imagining a sound at all, promoted 
the illusory perception that the discs bounced-off rather than crossed-by one another. The results 
from Experiment 1B (B) demonstrate that this effect was not a general effect that resulted form 
imagining anything at the moment of coincidence, as imagining a finger lift did not promote the 
illusory bounce percept (left). The same result was found in a ‘real-stimulus’ version of the 
experiment in which participants heard a real sound and actually moved their finger at the moment 
of coincidence (right). Asterisks indicate significant ps < .01. Error bars denote ± SEM. 
     The results from Experiment 2A & 2B of Study I revealed that imagined visual stimuli 
altered the perceived location of auditory stimuli. In Experiment 2A we calculated a percent 
visual bias (% visual bias)—the mean localization error when they heard an auditory stimulus 
and did not imagine a visual stimulus subtracted form the mean localization error when the 
participants imagined a visual stimulus at the same time as an auditory stimulus divided by 
the actual spatial disparity between the imagined visual and the real auditory stimulus, then 
multiplied by 100—for conditions where the imagined visual and real auditory stimulus came 
from different locations. We found that imagining a visual stimulus at the same time but in a 
different location as an auditory stimulus led to an illusory translocation of the auditory 
stimulus towards the imagined visual stimulus. We also found a larger % visual bias when the 
disparity between the visual and auditory stimulus was greater (i.e., 15° vs. 30°) (Figure 5A). 
Furthermore, we calculated a multisensory enhancement index (MEI)—the mean localization 
error when the auditory stimulus was presented alone, subtracted from the mean localization 
error when the participants imagined a visual stimulus at the same time as an auditory 
stimulus, divided by the mean localization error when the auditory stimulus was presented 
alone—and found that imaging a visual stimulus at the same time and same location as an 
auditory stimulus significantly enhanced auditory localization ability (see Figure 5B).  That 
is, participants were better at localizing an auditory stimulus when they imagined an auditory 
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stimulus in the same location compared to when they heard the auditory stimulus alone. Both 
the  % visual bias and MEI results were in line with the results from a ‘real-stimulus’ version 
of the experiment conducted at the conclusion of the imagery version of the experiment (see 
Figure 5AB).  
     Experiment 2B in Study I made use of a psychophysical staircasing procedure to 
examine whether visual imagery could bias visual perception in conditions that would be 
difficult to explain by response bias or tacit knowledge about the experiment. In this 
procedure, participants made binary (left or right) judgments about the location of sounds 
presented one at a time from the left or the right. The sounds began at the far left and right 
extreme edges of the visual display and moved gradually towards the center as participants 
made correct responses (see Methods above or Experiment 2B in Study I for more details). 
When participants made a wrong response, the sound location moved back one step (i.e., 
away from fixation) in the staircase. A region of uncertainty was then calculated for each 
subject as the average distance between the left and right staircases at which the first eight 
response reversals (i.e., a response reversal is defined as a response that was different than a 
previous response) occurred. We found that the region of uncertainty significantly increased 
when participants imagined seeing a visual stimulus in the center of the screen at the same 
time as they heard the auditory stimuli compared to when they were localizing the auditory 
stimuli alone (see Figure 5CD). This result is consistent with the hypothesis that auditory 
stimuli were translocated towards the imagined visual stimuli as a result of multisensory 
integration rather than due to response bias or tacit knowledge on the part of the participant.   
     In Experiment 3 in Study I we found that imagining an auditory speech stimulus could 
change visual speech perception. Making use of the McGurk effect, we found that imagining 
hearing /ba/ while participants watched silent videos of someone articulating /ga/ 
significantly promoted the illusory perception that the person in the video was articulating 
/da/ compared to when participants were imagining /ka/ or were simply viewing the videos. 
Moreover, we found that this effect was specific to individuals who perceived the classic 
version of the illusion in which /ba/ dubbed over someone articulating /ga/ leads to an illusory 
auditory perception of /da/ in a post-experiment free-response test for the effect (see Figure 
6). These findings suggest that auditory speech imagery can alter visual speech perception 
and are consistent with the reverse-McGurk effect (Charles Spence & Deroy, 2012; Sweeny 
et al., 2012). 
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Figure 5. Ventriloquist Illusion from imagining visual stimuli. The results from Experiment 2A 
(A-B) and Experiment 2B (C-D) from Study I.  Imagining a visual stimulus at the same time, but 
different location than an auditory stimulus significantly biased participants’ auditory perception 
(A, left) in the same manner as real visual stimuli (A, right).  Imagining a visual stimulus at the 
same time and same location as an auditory stimulus significantly improved participants’ ability to 
identify the source of an auditory stimulus (B, left). The same was found for real visual stimuli (B, 
right).  Imagining a visual stimulus at the center of the screen at the same time participants heard 
sounds from two converging staircases led to a translocation of auditory stimuli towards the 
imagined visual stimulus, as indicated by slower convergence of the auditory stimuli as participants 
made response reversals (C) and the increased region of uncertainty (i.e., the mean distance 
between the left and right staircases at response reversals 1-8)(D). Single asterisks indicate 
significant ps < .05, significant ps < .01. Error bars denote ± SEM.  
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Figure 6. What I imagine hearing can change what I think you said. Auditory imagery of /ba/ 
significantly promoted the illusory percept that people articulated /da/ rather than /ga/ compared 
to auditory imagery of /ka/ or simply viewing the visual stimuli. This imagery-induced effect on 
speech perception was specific to participants who perceive the classic McGurk illusion. 
Asterisk indicates a significant p < .05. Error bars denote ± SEM. 
     Together, the findings from Experiments 1-3 of Study I demonstrate that mental imagery 
in one sensory modality can change perception of a different sensory modality. Specifically, 
we found that imagined auditory and tactile stimuli can alter visual motion perception in 
Experiments 1A & 1B, that imagined visual stimuli can alter the perceived location of 
auditory stimuli in Experiments 2A & 2B, and that imagined auditory stimuli can alter 
visual speech perception in Experiment 3. These behavioral results are consistent with the 
findings presented here, and those from previous research documenting multisensory 
integration of real sensory stimuli. Further, they provide support for perception-based theories 
of mental imagery, and suggest that mental imagery can integrate with incoming sensory 
stimuli from a different sensory modality to shape perception. 
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4.2 STUDY II: WHAT WE IMAGINE HEARING CHANGES WHAT WE SEE 
4.2.1 Study II Background and Rationale 
     In Study II we sought to explore whether the imagery-induced cross-bounce illusion was 
a general effect of auditory imagery on visual perception, or whether it was specific to the 
content of the imagined auditory stimulus. Previous studies on the classic cross-bounce 
illusion have found that damped sounds, which simulate the acoustics of a collision, promote 
the illusory bounce percept, whereas ramped sounds (the same sounds played in reverse) do 
not, even though the ramped sounds are perceived as being louder, and more perceptually 
salient (Grassi & Casco, 2009, 2012). To this end, we reasoned that if the auditory imagery-
induced cross-bounce illusion relies on the same multisensory mechanisms as the veridical 
version of the illusion (Bushara et al., 2003), then we should expect imagined damped and 
not imagined ramped sounds to produce the cross-bounce illusion. Thus in Experiment 1A 
of Study II we sought to examine whether imagined damped, but not imagined ramped 
sounds led to the cross-bounce illusion. Further, we sought to rule out alternative 
explanations of the illusion such as response bias or tacit knowledge by subtly manipulating 
the extent the moving discs overlapped, and are therefore perceived as crossing. We predicted 
that if participants were responding on the basis of tacit knowledge or response bias, we 
would see uniform responses (of bounce or cross) for a given imagined sound across the 
different overlap conditions; however, if participants are reporting their genuine perception, 
then the probability of a bounce percept should scale according to the extent that the discs 
overlap. Experiment 1B of Study II was a ‘real-stimulus’ version of the experiment, in 
which the auditory stimuli were actually heard (rather than imagined) at the moment of 
coincidence, to compare with the imagery version of the experiment.  
     Furthermore, in a third experiment (Experiment 2, Study II) we specifically sought to 
examine whether the effect of auditory imagery on visual perception could be attributable to 
purely attentional mechanisms by asking participants to attend to whether the visual stimuli 
overlapped or not, and measuring their performance (which requires visual attention) on this 
task, while imagining the ramped, damped, or simply viewing the stimuli. We predicted that 
performance on the visual attention task would decrease when participants imagined the 
auditory stimuli, compared to when they did not imagine anything; however, we predicted 
that if the effect were multisensory rather than attentional, there should be no difference in 
performance (i.e., sensitivity index = d´) when imagining the damped vs. imagining ramped 
sounds. Moreover, in this same experiment we could measure the extent to which imagining a 
particular auditory stimulus, or not imagining an auditory stimulus, led to a particular 
response strategy (i.e., response bias index = c).  
4.2.2  Study II Results and Conclusions 
     In Experiment 1A we found that imagining a damped sound significantly promoted the 
illusion that the discs bounced-off rather than crossed-by one-another, whereas the imagining 
the same sound played backwards (i.e., a ramped sound) did not, compared to simply viewing 
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the stimuli (see Figure 7a). Moreover, we found that the increased bounce-percept scaled 
according to the extent that the discs overlapped, suggesting that the effect represents a 
genuine change in perception rather than response bias or tacit knowledge. These 
observations were consistent with findings of the ‘real-stimulus’ version of the experiment 
conducted on an independent group of subjects in Experiment 1B (see Figure 7b).  
Furthermore, we also calculated the strength of the imagery-induced cross-bounce illusion as 
the mean difference between the proportion of perceived bounce when the participants 
imagined hearing the damped vs. ramped sound and found that it was significantly correlated 
with how vividly the participants were able to imagine the auditory stimuli (see Figure 8). 
 
Figure 7.  What one imagines hearing changes what one sees. The results from Experiment 
1a (a) and Experiment 1b (b) on the perceived bounce of two passing objects as a function of 
the type of sound imagined (i.e., damped, ramped, or none), or real sound heard in Experiment 
1b, across the three different overlap conditions (i.e., the extent that the discs overlapped in the 
center of the screen, which is directly related to how ‘bounce-like’ they are perceived be). Error 
bars denote ± SEM. 
     The results from Experiment 2 revealed that although the participants’ sensitivity (d´) 
changed across the degree to which the discs overlapped (60 vs. 80), there was no change in 
the participants’ sensitivities when they imagined a damped, ramped, or simply viewed the 
stimuli (see Figure 9a). This finding suggests that imagining the auditory stimuli at the 
moment the discs met did not lead to systematic changes in visual attention that might 
account for the increased perception of bounce.  That is, this result suggests that the effect 
cannot be due to the possibility that the participants’ attention was drawn away from the 
visual stimuli when they imagined the damped sound and thereby increased their propensity 
to respond that the discs bounce more than cross.  Moreover, we also analyzed whether 
imagining a damped auditory stimulus lead to a biased response pattern compared to when 
they imagined a ramped auditory stimulus or simply viewed the visual stimuli. The results 
confirmed that imagining a damped sound did not lead to a particular response strategy 
compared to imagining a ramped sound or not imagining a sound. Once again, the only 
difference in response strategy was observed between the overlap conditions (see Figure 9b).  
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Figure 8. How well one imagines sounds predicts how much they see the discs bounce. Plot 
(and 95% confidence interval bands) of the significant relationship between the participants’ 
self-reported vividness of the imagined sounds and the strength of the cross-bounce illusion. 
Dotted line denotes the divide between the participants who perceived the illusion and those 
who did not.  
 
 
Figure 9. What one imagines does not alter one’s attention nor how one responds, generally.  
Plots of the sensitivity indices (i.e., d´)(a) and response biases (c)(b) as a function of the overlap 
and imagery conditions indicating. These results indicated that imagery of sounds had no influence 
of sensitivity compared to not imagining a sound, nor did imagining a sound lead to a particular 
response strategy compared to not imagining a sound. Only the overlap conditions (60% and 80%) 
had a significant effect on sensitivities and response biases.  
     The findings from Study II suggest that the cross-modal effect of imagined auditory 
stimuli on visual motion perception are specific to the kinds of sounds that produce the 
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classic version of the illusion.   Moreover, these findings firmly establish that this effect 
represents a genuine phenomenon of perception and go further to rule out that the effects we 
observed for the increased perception of bounce can be explained by differences in attention 
or response strategies for the different kinds of stimuli. These results of Experiment 2 were 
even stronger evidence that the effect cannot be explained by attentional mechanisms or 
response bias, as we did not observe significant difference between imagined auditory stimuli 
and not imagining any stimuli. This finding stands in slight contrast to those from the classic 
version of the experiment which have found that a real auditory stimulus can effect sensitivity 
to the stimuli compared to no auditory stimulus (Grassi & Casco, 2009). Thus, when real 
auditory stimuli are presented at the moment of coincidence, attention alone cannot account 
for the perception of bounce, and the results here demonstrate that attention cannot account 
for the perception of bounce at all.  Furthermore, the finding that imagined damped and not 
imagined ramped sounds produced the cross-bounce illusion is consistent with the ‘unity 
assumption’ principle of multisensory integration which proposes that only meaningful 
combinations of multisensory stimuli are optimally integrated (De Gelder & Bertelson, 2003; 
Vatakis & Spence, 2007; Welch & Warren, 1980). That is, because a damped sound 
simulates the acoustics typical of a collision, but the ramped sounds do not, imagery of the 
former and not the latter is optimally integrated to change perception. Finally, these results 
provide additional evidence that the integration of real and imagined sensory stimuli across 
the senses relies on the same integrative mechanisms as the integration of real cross-modal 
stimuli.   
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4.3 STUDY III: THE FUSION OF SENSATION AND MENTAL IMAGERY IN THE 
TEMPORAL ASSOCIATION CORTEX 
4.3.1 Study III Background and Rationale 
     Previous studies have found that that mental imagery within a specific sensory modality 
involves largely overlapping neural representations with perceiving those sensory stimuli 
(Bunzeck et al., 2005; Cichy et al., 2011; Ehrsson, Geyer, & Naito, 2003; Kosslyn et al., 
2001; O’Craven & Kanwisher, 2000; Oh et al., 2013; Roth et al., 1996) Therefore, we 
hypothesized that if mental imagery and perception rely on overlapping neural 
representations, then the integration of imagined and real sensory stimuli across sensory 
modalities should involve overlapping mechanisms as well.  To investigate this possibility we 
made use of functional magnetic resonance imaging fMRI and the imagery-induced 
ventriloquist effect from Study I.  Specifically, we examined whether synchronous, but 
spatially disparate imagined visual but real auditory stimuli lead to increased activation in the 
multisensory temporal association cortex. We also examined whether synchronous, but 
spatially disparate imagined visual but real auditory stimuli lead to increased effective 
connectivity between the temporal association cortex and the auditory cortex. Moreover, we 
examined the relationship between the strength of the imagery-induced ventriloquism effect 
and activity in the multisensory temporal association cortex and the strength of the effective 
connectivity between the temporal association cortex and the auditory cortex. In order to limit 
our search to brain areas responsive to multisensory stimuli a ‘real-stimulus’ version of the 
ventriloquism paradigm served as a functional localizer for this study.   
4.3.2 Study III Results and Conclusions 
     We first assessed the behavioral results obtained from the scanner by calculating a 
ventriloquism index for each subject. The ventriloquism index was calculated by coding the 
responses for left, center, and right, as -1, 0, and 1, respectively, then averaging by condition, 
and subtracting each participants average bias in the auditory only condition (from functional 
localizer blocks) from the synchronous and asynchronous audiovisual conditions. This 
analysis controls for false positives (i.e., instances where the participants indicate that the 
auditory stimulus comes from same direction as the imagined visual stimulus because of a 
baseline perceptual bias in a particular direction). The results form this analysis revealed that 
imagining a visual stimulus at the same time (synchronously; AVi sync.) but different location 
than an auditory stimulus lead to a significant translocation of auditory stimuli towards the 
imagined visual stimuli compared to when the visual stimuli was imagined at a different time 
(asynchronously; AVi async.) and location than auditory stimuli (see Figure 10A). The same 
result was found during functional localizer runs in which real visual stimuli were presented 
synchronously (AV sync.) or asynchronously (AV async.) in spatially disparate locations 
rather than imagined (see Figure 10B).  
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Figure 10.  What one imagines seeing in the scanner changes where one hears sounds in the 
scanner. The behavioral results from Study III revealing a significantly stronger ventriloquism 
effect (i.e., translocation of auditory stimuli towards visual stimuli) for imagining visual stimuli 
at the same time as, but different location than, real auditory stimuli (AVi sync.) compared to 
imagining visual stimuli at a different time as, and different location than, real auditory stimuli 
(AVi async.) in the main experiment (A). The same comparison between synchronous (AV 
sync.) vs. asynchronously presented (AV async.) spatially disparate audiovisual stimuli from 
functional localizer blocks (B).  Asterisks denote significant ps < .05.  Error bars denote ± 
SEM. 
     The main fMRI analysis compared the BOLD response for AVi sync. compared to AVi 
async. stimuli and found significant activation within the left superior temporal sulcus (L. 
STS) (Figure 11A-B). We also calculated the strength of the imagery ventriloquism effect for 
each participant (i.e., the difference of the AVi sync. and AVi async. ventriloquism indices) 
and examined whether there was any activity that was related to the strength of the imagery-
induced ventriloquism effect in a whole brain multiple regression analysis. This analysis 
revealed that activity in the L. STS could be predicted by the strength of the mental imagery-
induced ventriloquist effect (see Figure 11C).  
     A psychophysical interaction (PPI) analysis was conducted in order to examine whether 
AVi sync. was associated with increased effective connectivity between the STS and the 
auditory cortex compared to AVi async. The benefit of a PPI analysis is that it allows you to 
examine changes in effective connectivity between one region and remote brain areas as a 
function of your experimental manipulation. The PPI analysis revealed increased connectivity 
between the L. STS and the auditory cortex during the AVi sync. condition compared to the 
AVi async. condition (see Figure 11D-E). Furthermore, we assessed the relationship between 
the strength of the mental imagery-induced ventriloquism effect and the effective 
connectivity between the L. STS and the auditory cortex across participants, and found that a 
stronger imagery induced ventriloquism effect was associated with stronger effective 
connectivity between the L. STS and the auditory cortex (see Figure 11F).   
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Figure 11. The neural correlates of the imagery-induced ventriloquist effect. Imagining 
visual stimuli at the same time, but different location as real auditory stimuli (AVi sync.) lead to 
a significant increase in the BOLD response in the left superior temporal sulcus (L. STS) 
compared to imagining visual stimuli at a different time and location (AVi async.)(A).  
Parameter estimates for this comparison reveal this was due to a significant increase of 
activation in AVi sync. vs. AVi async., rather then de-activation (B). The strength of the mental 
imagery-induced ventriloquism effect was significantly predicted by the strength of the activity 
in the L. STS across participants for the above comparison (C). The AVi sync. condition was 
also associated with  increased effective connectivity between the L. STS and auditory cortex 
compared to the AVi async. conidion (D). Plot of the increased effective connectivity for one 
representative subject in the form of a steeper regression slope for the AVi sync. condition 
compared to the AVi async. condition (E).  The strength of the mental imagery-induced 
ventriloquism effect was also significantly predicted by the strength of the effective 
connectivity between the L. STS and auditory cortex for the above contrast (AVi sync. vs. AVi 
async.) across participants (F).  Error bars denote ± SEM. 
     Together, the findings from Study III suggest the integration of real and imagined 
audiovisual stimuli involves the same neural mechanisms as the integration of real 
audiovisual stimuli. Moreover, our findings suggest that the imagery-induced ventriloquism 
effect is associated with activity in the multisensory association cortex, and with increased 
connectivity between the multisensory temporal association cortex and the auditory cortex. 
This finding suggests that the temporal association cortex may play a modulatory role in 
auditory perception when integrating spatially disparate imagined visual and real auditory 
stimuli. These findings are also consistent with previous neuroimaging studies on the classic 
version of the ventriloquist effect (Bischoff et al., 2007; Bonath et al., 2007). The 
involvement of the L. STS is consistent with previous neuroimaging studies implication the 
STS in the integration of audiovisual stimuli across a range of stimulus types (Beauchamp, 
Lee, et al., 2004; Beauchamp et al., 2010; Bischoff et al., 2007; Driver & Noesselt, 2008; 
Nath & Beauchamp, 2011; Noesselt et al., 2007; Werner & Noppeney, 2010b). Furthermore, 
the results from this study and previous neuroimaging studies in humans are also consistent 
with electrophysiological recordings in nonhuman primates which have found that the STS 
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contains cells that integrate auditory and visual stimuli at the level of the single neuron 
(Bruce et al., 1981; Dahl et al., 2009; Perrodin et al., 2014; Schroeder & Foxe, 2002).  These 
findings also provide strong support for ‘perception-like’ theories of mental imagery, and 
demonstrate that the overlap in neural representation of real and imagined sensory stimuli 
extend to the more perceptually ecological context of multisensory perception.   
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4.4 STUDY IV: RAPIDLY INDUCED AUDITORY PLASTICITY BY IMAGINED 
VISUAL STIMULI 
4.4.1 Study IV Background and Rationale 
     In Study IV we investigated whether repeated exposure to the imagery-induced 
ventriloquist illusion could lead to plasticity of our auditory system. Research on the classic 
ventriloquist effect has found that repeated exposure to synchronously presented spatially 
disparate audiovisual stimuli leads to a recalibration of auditory system in the direction of the 
visual stimulus even when the visual stimulus is no longer present—i.e., a ventriloquism 
aftereffect (Lewald, 2002; Recanzone, 1998; Wozny & Shams, 2011). In light of the 
behavioral and neuroimaging evidence presented above suggesting that the integration of 
imagined and real multisensory stimuli seems to rely on similar mechanisms as the 
integration of real multisensory stimuli, we predicted that there should be a measureable 
change in future auditory perception following repeated exposure to synchronous, but 
spatially disparate imagined visual and real auditory stimuli—i.e., an imagery-induced 
ventriloquist aftereffect. Thus, in Study IV we took advantage of the imagery-induced 
ventriloquist effect to examine whether it can lead to changes in future auditory perception. In 
this experiment we had participants imagine the visual stimulus for 100 ms, once per second, 
in the center of the screen for 30 s.  In separate blocks, an auditory stimulus was either 
presented in the same location (i.e., same adaption) as the imagined visual stimulus, 8° to the 
left of the imagined visual stimulus (i.e., rightward adaptation), or 8° to the right (i.e., 
leftward adaptation)8 of the imagined visual stimulus. Following this exposure phase, the 
participants heard sounds come from five different locations (i.e., ±16°, ±8°, or 0°) and 
indicated whether they heard the sound come from the left or the right. From these data we 
measured the participants point of subjective equivalence (PSE)—the point at which the 
participants could no longer perceive an auditory stimulus from the left or the right.  We 
predicted that the PSE would be shifted to the right following leftward adaption (i.e., auditory 
stimuli presented to the right of the imagined visual stimulus), but shifted to the left following 
rightward adaption (i.e., auditory stimuli presented to the left of the imagined visual 
stimulus), compared to a non-adaptation control condition (i.e., auditory stimuli presented in 
the same location as the imagined visual stimulus). 
4.4.2 Study IV Results and Conclusions 
     The results from Experiment 1a of Study IV revealed a significant leftward shift in the 
PSEs for sounds localized following rightward adaption compared to sounds localized 
following same location adaptation. Moreover, we found a significant rightward shift in PSEs 
                                                
8 I know that may seem like a mistake because a sound on the left is rightward adaptation and a sound on the 
right is rightward adaption, but rest assured it is not. It is leftward adaptation when the auditory stimulus was 
presented on the right because the auditory stimulus should be translocated towards the visual stimulus, which in 
this case is on the left; hence, leftward adaption. The opposite, of course is true for rightward adaption, in which 
an auditory stimulus presented on the left leads to a translocation of the auditory stimulus towards the visual 
stimulus on its right, and is therefore, rightward adaptation.  
C.C. Berger    Where Imagination Meets Sensation  
 
  56 
for sounds localized following leftward adaption, compared to same location adaption (see 
Figure 12AB). These results were consistent with a ‘real-stimulus’ version of the experiment 
(Experiment 1b) conducted on a separate group of subjects (see Figure 12CD). These 
results represent the first evidence of a shift in the perceived location of auditory stimuli 
following cross-modal adaptation of real and imagined stimuli.  
     Additional experiments examined whether this imagery induced-ventriloquism aftereffect 
was selective to the specific type of sound being played. This would strengthen the 
conclusion that the same neural mechanisms involved in the plasticity of the auditory system 
were engaged as with real stimuli in the classic ventriloquism aftereffect which has been 
shown to be specific to the type of sounds being presented during adaptation (Recanzone, 
1998; Woods & Recanzone, 2004). Furthermore, these experiments were conducted to rule 
out that the effect was merely the result of being presented with auditory stimuli in a spatial 
location to the left or right repeatedly. Note, that this is highly unlikely, given that this would 
mean that the participants responded counter to the location the auditory stimulus was 
presented during the adaptation periods when making their responses in the test phases. 
Nevertheless, in Experiment 2a we examined whether adaptation to an imagined visual 
stimulus at the same time as, but different location than a sine-wave auditory stimulus would 
change future auditory perception of a white-noise auditory stimulus (used in both adaptation 
and test phases in Experiments 1a & 1b above), which we predicted would not be the case.  
In line with previous studies on the ventriloquist aftereffect that have demonstrated that the 
ventriloquism aftereffect does not transfer across sounds with different frequencies 
(Recanzone, 1998; Woods & Recanzone, 2004), we found no transference of adaption from 
the sine-wave auditory stimulus to the white noise stimulus from Experiments 1a & 1b (see 
Figure 13AB). This was consistent with the results obtained from a ‘real-stimulus’ version of 
the experiment conducted on a separate group of participants, in which the participants 
actually saw rather than imagined the visual stimuli (see Figure 13CD).  
     Together, the results from these experiments suggest that a systematic spatial discrepancy 
between visual mental imagery and a real auditory stimulus can lead to multisensory 
recalibration and plasticity in our auditory perceptual system. Moreover, we found that this 
imagery-induced ventriloquism aftereffect was specific to the auditory stimuli to which the 
adaption occurred. This is consistent with previous studies on the ventriloquism aftereffect 
(Recanzone, 1998; Woods & Recanzone, 2004). Furthermore, these findings cannot be 
explained by changes in attention, response bias, or tacit knowledge, once again providing 
strong evidence in support of perception-based theories of mental imagery. Indeed, it is hard 
to see how the adaptation aftereffect—and the underlying plastic neuronal changes—would 
arise unless the imagery-induced ventriloquist effect engaged the same basic multisensory 
integration mechanisms as the classic ventriloquist effect (i.e., with real audiovisual stimuli).  
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Figure 12. What I imagine seeing changes where I hear sounds in the future. The results 
from Study IV demonstrating the imagery-induced aftereffect.  Logistic regression curves fitted 
to the group localization data for the leftward, rightward, and same location adaptation 
conditions for imagined visual stimuli (A), and the bar plot of the mean of the PSEs across 
participants (B). Logistic regression curves fitted to the group localization data for the leftward, 
rightward, and same location adaptation conditions for the ‘real-stimulus’ version of the 
experiment in which visual stimuli were actually presented rather than imagined (C), and the 
bar plot of the mean PSEs across participants for this experiment (D). Dotted lines pointing to 
the x-axis in A and C indicate the PSE across participants. Error bars denote ± SEM. 
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Figure 13. What I imagine seeing does not change where I hear different sounds in the 
future. The results from the control experiments of Study IV demonstrating that the imagery-
induced aftereffect does not transfer across sound types.  Logistic regression curves fitted to the 
group localization data for the leftward, rightward, and same location adaptation conditions for 
imagined visual stimuli (A), and the bar plot of the mean of the PSEs across participants (B). 
Logistic regression curves fitted to the group localization data for the leftward, rightward, and 
same location adaptation conditions for the ‘real-stimulus’ version of the experiment in which 
visual stimuli were actually presented rather than imagined (C), and the bar plot of the mean 
PSEs across participants for this experiment (D). Dotted lines pointing to the x-axis in A and C 
indicate the PSE across participants. Error bars denote ± SEM. 
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5 DISCUSSION  
     Can what you imagine in one sensory modality change what you perceive in another? Yes, 
it can! In the experiments within this thesis we have found evidence that imagined sensory 
stimuli can fuse with incoming sensory signals to change perception of the world around us. 
In Studies I and Study II, we found that imagining a sound at the moment two passing 
objects meet promoted the illusory perception that they bounce off one another rather than 
cross-by one another. In Study II we found that this was only for sounds that simulate the 
acoustics of a collision. In Study I, we also found evidence that imagining an auditory speech 
stimulus can change visual speech perception.  In Study I and Study III we found that 
imagining a visual stimulus can change the perceived location of an auditory stimulus.  
Furthermore, In Study III we found that this visual imagery induced change in auditory 
localization was associated with activity in the superior temporal sulcus (STS), a key region 
involved in the integration of real audiovisual stimuli. We also found that the visual imagery-
induced ventriloquist effect was associated with increased effective connectivity between the 
STS and the auditory cortex. These activation and connectivity patterns were closely related 
to those found for the influence of real visual stimuli on auditory perception. Lastly, in Study 
IV, we found that repeated exposure to the imagery-induced ventriloquist effect can change 
where we hear sounds in the future. Together, these findings make a strong case that what we 
imagine in one sensory modality can change what we perceive in another.  
     The idea that mental imagery and perception are similar in kind and rely on overlapping 
neural representations is not a new idea, and is supported en masse by previous work (Borst 
& Kosslyn, 2008; Ehrsson et al., 2003; Farah et al., 1989; Farah, 1989b; James, 1890; 
Kosslyn et al., 2001; Kosslyn, 1994; O’Craven & Kanwisher, 2000; Pearson, Clifford, & 
Tong, 2008b; Segal & Fusella, 1970). However, this idea has been met with a great deal of 
criticism since it was first proposed and there are those who have argued that mental imagery 
is merely the result of some other more basic level of conscious processing (Pylyshyn, 1973, 
2002). Although this argument has its original roots in philosophy, and non-perception based 
theories of mental imagery have few hard-lined supporters today, skepticism about the results 
from studies on mental imagery has persisted and made its way into the modern 
psychological and cognitive neuroscience literatures. How do our results fit into this debate?  
Our results are in line with the behavioral and neuroimaging evidence that suggest that 
mental imagery and perception involve shared representations (Halpern & Zatorre, 1999; 
Huang & Sereno, 2013; Kosslyn et al., 2001; Oh et al., 2013); and that because of this, mental 
imagery has a functional impact on ongoing and future perception (Dils & Boroditsky, 2010; 
Farah & Smith, 1983; Farah, 1989a; Pearson et al., 2008b; Segal & Fusella, 1970; Winawer 
et al., 2010). However, in contrast to studies on within-modality sensory interactions, we 
have been able to demonstrate that these similarities extend to a more ecological, 
multisensory context. Everyday perception is ordinarily a multisensory process, so much so 
that some have come to question whether the sole function of the neocortex is to integrate the 
information from our different senses, and further, whether it was ever reasonable to assume 
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that the senses operate independently during everyday cognition (Ghazanfar & Schroeder, 
2006). Thus, in order to understand the nature of mental imagery and its functional impact on 
perception clearly, one must take into account the multisensory context in which those mental 
images are generated and whether they integrated and interacted with our senses in the same 
manner our senses do normally. In this way, our findings are fundamentally different from 
previous studies investigating the similarities between mental imagery and perception, as well 
as the functional impact of mental imagery on perception; and by the same token, 
fundamentally important. However, vestiges of the classic mental imagery debate (i.e., how 
perception-like mental imagery is) can still be found today in methodological concerns about 
whether the results from experiments on mental imagery can be explained by tacit knowledge 
or response bias. 
     One of the most common criticisms of behavioral experiments investigating the 
similarities between mental imagery and perception is that the effects can be explained by 
response bias, i.e., that the participant knew or guessed the hypothesis of the experiment, and 
had an explicit strategy to change their response to conform to what we were looking for; or 
tacit knowledge, i.e., that the participants implicitly knew what the experiment was looking 
for and inadvertently responded according to the hypothesis because of an implicit bias. 
These arguments were originally championed by proponents propositional theories of mental 
imagery to explain away effects which seemed to confirm that mental imagery and perception 
rely on overlapping representations (Anderson, 1978, 1979; Pylyshyn, 1973, 2002), but have 
since been co-opted by anyone skeptical of results obtained by experiments on mental 
imagery or in behavioral experiments in psychology at large. Furthermore, in research on 
multisensory integration, a common concern when measuring the effect of cross-modal 
stimuli on perception is the extent to which the circumstances under which the resultant 
change in perception can be explained by attentional mechanisms alone, rather than by the 
integration of the cross-modal stimuli (Grassi & Casco, 2009; C Spence & Driver, 1997; 
Watanabe & Shimojo, 1998).  Of course, attention plays an important role in the successful 
integration of multisensory stimuli (Bachmann, 2011; Gondan, Blurton, Hughes, & Greenlee, 
2011; Mishra & Gazzaley, 2012; C Spence & Driver, 1996; Zvyagintsev, Nikolaev, Sachs, & 
Mathiak, 2011) and so it is not possible to completely preclude its role in studies on human 
perception. Therefore, it was important to ensure that attention, or explicit or implicit 
response biases alone cannot explain the behavioral and neuroimaging effects we observe in 
our studies if we are to make meaningful claims about the integration of real and imagined 
cross-modal stimuli.  
     In all the studies in this thesis (Studies I-IV), we have taken special care to avoid concerns 
regarding implicit or explicit response biases, and to minimize the role of attention as an 
alternative explanation for our results.  For studies on the cross-bounce illusion, it was 
important to rule out (a) that the increased bounce effect was not due to tacit knowledge or 
response bias, and (b) that the effect could be due to changes in exogenous spatial attention 
rather than due to the integration of the imagined auditory stimuli with the moving visual 
stimuli.  Thus, in order to compliment the results of Experiment1A of Study I in which we 
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demonstrated that imagining a sound at the moment two objects meet promotes an illusory 
bounce percept, we designed a control experiment to examine whether imagining anything at 
the moment of coincidence would produce the same illusion. In Experiment 1B of Study 1 
we found that imagining the act of lifting the index finger did not produce the illusory effect, 
suggesting that the effect cannot be explained by general attention or the cognitive task set of 
performing any kind of imagery.  This finding suggested that the resultant change in motion 
perception found in Experiment 1A was due to the cross-modal influence of the sound on 
visual perception when imagined at the moment of coincidence; however, it is possible that 
imagining the finger lift and imagining the sound recruit attentional resources differently, as 
imagining a sound at the moment of coincidence may divert attention to an exogenous 
sensory stimulus at the moment of coincidence differently than an imagined finger lift, and 
the resulting change in perception could be due to unavoidable differences in attention when 
imagining these two very different types of stimuli. Note, that this interpretation of 
Experiments 1A & 1B of Study I is unlikely given that imagining a finger tap at the 
moment of coincidence significantly promoted the illusory bounce percept, whereas the 
finger lift did not; two almost identical imagined stimuli, except that the imagined finger tap 
contains a discrete sensory event which is akin to the vibration associated with a collision, 
and is known to induce the cross-bounce illusion (Shimojo & Shams, 2001b; Watanabe & 
Shimojo, 1998), and the imagined finger lift does not. However, an additional criticism could 
be that the participants were responding not based on their genuine change in perception but 
due to implicit or explicit response strategies, i.e., that the participants knew that we expected 
them to press bounce when they imagined the auditory stimulus at the moment the discs met 
and responded accordingly. Concerning explicit response strategies, a funneled debriefing 
following the methodology detailed by Bargh and Chartrand (2000) revealed that none of the 
participants had discerned the hypothesis of the experiments.  However, in light of these 
concerns, we wanted to experimentally explore the possibility that these results are 
contaminated by attentional or response bias.  
     Previous studies on the cross-bounce illusion have manipulated the content of the auditory 
stimuli to rule out that the classic version of the cross-bounce illusion could be due to 
attention alone, and further have manipulated the extent to which the moving discs appear to 
be bouncing to rule out that the cross-bounce illusion is merely due to a change in response 
strategies of participants rather than a genuine change in perception (Grassi & Casco, 2009, 
2012).  Specifically, Grassi & Casco (2009) found that a damped auditory stimulus (which 
simulates the acoustics of naturally colliding objects) produces the illusion reliably and 
robustly, but that the same sound played backwards (i.e., a ramped auditory stimulus) does 
not, despite the fact that the latter is perceived as more perceptually salient (Grassi & Casco, 
2009). Furthermore, by manipulating the extent that the discs overlap (and therefore are 
perceived as bouncing or not) and examining participants’ performance in determining 
whether the discs overlapped or not (i.e., a visual discrimination task requiring attention) 
Grassi and Casco (2012) were able to examine whether the presentation of a sound led to 
specific change in attention which could explain the cross-bounce effect, as well as whether 
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the auditory stimulus produced a specific response strategy, by calculating sensitivity (d) and 
response bias indices (c), respectively.  Thus in Study II, we made use of these techniques to 
examine whether imagining a damped sound vs. a ramped sound led to content specific 
changes in visual motion perception, and whether the changes in visual motion perception 
could be accounted for by attention or response biases alone, by calculating the sensitivity 
(d´) and response bias (c) indices from participants’ ability to identify whether the discs 
overlapped or not.  We found that imagining a damped, but not a ramped stimulus induced 
the cross-bounce illusion, and that the extent to which the imagined damped auditory 
stimulus changed visual motion perception changed as a function of the extent to which the 
discs overlapped (suggesting that the participants did not base their response on the simple 
heuristic, “press bounce when imagining the damped sound”). These results were consistent 
with a real-auditory stimulus version of the experiment conducted in a separate group of 
participants. Moreover, we found that imagining the damped vs. ramped auditory stimulus 
did not lead to significant changes in attentional sensitivity (d´) nor response biases (c) 
compared simply viewing the stimuli. This was strong behavioral evidence that the imagery-
induced motion bounce illusion reflects the integration of the imagined auditory stimulus and 
the perceived visual stimulus rather than changes in attention or response biases.  Taken 
together, we found that the cross-modal effects of auditory mental imagery on visual motion 
perception could not be accounted for by changes in visual attention or response biases 
(Experiment 1A & 2, Study II), and that they conformed to the same temporal (Experiment 
1A, Study I) and unity assumption (Experiment 1A, Study II) principles as multisensory 
integration of real sensory stimuli.  
     The classic McGurk illusion is usually immune to concerns over response bias or 
attention, because the resultant change in perception is a novel percept that is spontaneously 
reported by the participant rather than shift or bias in perception. However, in order to adapt 
this experiment to our experimental question, we asked participants to imagine hearing the 
auditory stimuli and to report what they thought the person in the video was saying (Study I, 
Experiment 3); thus, this is an effect of auditory stimuli (imagined in our case) on visual 
perception—a reverse McGurk effect of sorts (Charles Spence & Deroy, 2012; Sweeny et al., 
2012). Because the visual stimulus is quite ambiguous, it was necessary to restrict the 
participants’ responses in order to obtain responses consistent enough to examine statistically 
between the conditions of our experimental manipulation (this is much like restricting the 
responses in the cross-bounce illusion to ‘bounce’ or ‘cross’ as free response could lead to a 
wide array of descriptions about the motion that are not interesting or relevant, and would 
make comparing the responses statistically difficult). For this reason, we chose to give the 
participants the option between the non-illusory percept (i.e., /ga/), and the illusory percept 
(i.e., /da/). We found that auditory imagery of the incongruent auditory stimulus /ba/ 
significantly promoted the illusory percept that people in silent videos articulating /ga/ were 
articulating /da/ compared to when the participants imagined hearing /ka/, an auditory 
stimulus with a similar articulation. One could argue that this effect may only be due to a 
propensity to respond /ba/ when participants imagined hearing /ba/ that is independent of the 
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fusion of the imagined auditory and real visual stimuli (i.e., tacit knowledge); however, if this 
were the case, then we would see the same response tendency for those who perceived the 
classic illusion and those who do not (the participants were categorized as McGurk perceivers 
and non-perceivers on the basis of a post-experiment free-response test for the McGurk 
illusion). Instead we observed a dissociation between those who perceived the classic illusion 
and those who did not on their susceptibilities to auditory imagery-induced illusion. This 
suggests that the participants were responding on the basis of their genuine perception, and 
one that corresponded to their experience of the fusion of those same audiovisual stimuli 
when tested with real audiovisual stimuli. Interestingly, the categorization of McGurk 
perceivers and non-perceivers is a relatively new area of study, as it had previously been 
generally assumed that this was a universal effect (Gurler, Doyle, Walker, Magnotti, & 
Beauchamp, 2015; Magnotti et al., 2015; Nath & Beauchamp, 2012). These individual 
differences in the perceptibility of the McGurk effect have recently been found to be 
associated with where the participants look when observing others speak—individuals that 
focus on the mouth tend to perceive the illusion, whereas individuals whose gaze moves 
around the face tend not to perceive the illusion (Gurler et al., 2015)—above other suspected 
factors such as one’s native language (Magnotti et al., 2015).  
      In Experiment 2A in Study I, we found that visual mental imagery led to a significant 
shift in the perceived location of auditory stimuli when imagined in a disparate location (as 
measured by the % visual bias), and led to a significant enhancement in auditory localization 
(as measured by the MEI)—i.e., ventriloquism effect—when imagined in the same location 
as an auditory stimulus. One possible concern with these findings is that the direction of the 
perceived shift in auditory localization is always in the direction of the imagined visual 
stimulus, and therefore, could just be the result of the following heuristic: “wherever I 
imagine the visual stimulus, click in that location.” Thus, the effect could simply be the result 
of response bias or a shift in spatial attention towards the location of the visual stimulus rather 
than the perceptual shift due to the integration of the real auditory and imagined visual 
stimuli. This is a problem that also exists for classic experiments on the ventriloquist effect in 
which the participants indicate the perceived location of the auditory stimuli by pointing 
(Bertelson, Frissen, Vroomen, & de Gelder, 2006; Howard & Templeton, 1966; Thurlow & 
Jack, 1973; Vroomen & Stekelenburg, 2014), and so to address this concern, researchers have 
employed various psychophysical techniques to examine the ventriloquism effect under 
conditions in which the hypothesized shift in auditory perception cannot be explained by 
changes in attention or response bias (Alais & Burr, 2004; Vroomen & Stekelenburg, 2014).  
     One such technique is a psychophysical staircasing procedure in which auditory stimuli 
are presented one at a time from two descending staircases (randomly selected). In this 
procedure, the auditory stimuli are first presented from the far left or right, and gradually 
converge towards the center as participants correctly report whether they heard the sound 
come from the left or the right (Vroomen et al., 2001).  When the participant makes an error, 
the next sound presented is from one step backwards in that staircase (i.e., further away from 
fixation), and this procedure continues until the participant has made a certain number of 
C.C. Berger    Where Imagination Meets Sensation  
 
  64 
response reversals (i.e., responses that were different than the previous response for that 
staircase). In order to determine whether a ventriloquism effect occurs, a visual stimulus is 
presented at the same moment as the auditory stimuli but in the center of the screen. The 
prediction is that because auditory stimuli are translocated towards the visual stimuli, the 
participants become uncertain about the location of the auditory stimuli earlier on in the 
staircases, and therefore start to make errors about whether an auditory stimulus came from 
the left or the right earlier on in the staircase. Importantly, this change in perception is 
measured from the left/right judgments about the sounds, and the final comparison between 
conditions is performed on the average distance between left and right staircases. In this way, 
the task, as well as the final analysis of the data to assess our hypothesis, is completely un-
intuitive from the perspective of the participant. Even if they could somehow guess the 
hypothesis of the experiment, the participants (a) had no idea under what conditions the 
experiment will end (as the experiment ends once the participant has reached a pre-
determined number of response reversals) and (b) had no idea what the other conditions of 
the experiment are before partaking in that respective condition (i.e., the participant was 
unaware that they would perform the auditory localization task again and under what 
circumstances, which they would need to know in order to adjust their response in a manner 
consistent with our hypothesis).  Thus, Experiment 2B in Study I we employed this 
technique and found that imagined visual stimuli at the same time as the auditory stimuli, but 
in the center of the screen, led to earlier response reversals and slower convergence of the left 
and right staircases—consistent with the notion that the auditory stimuli were translocated 
towards the imagined visual stimuli—compared to when participants did not imagine the 
visual stimuli. In this setup, however, we cannot fully rule out that visual attention played a 
role, as one could argue that imagining the visual stimulus compared to not imagining the 
stimulus allocates visual attention resources to the center of the screen, and therefore leads to 
response reversals earlier on because attentional resources have been allocated to the center 
of the screen and away from the auditory stimuli presented on the left or the right. This is 
very unlikely, however, because the participants were fixating on the center of the screen in 
both the imagery and non-imagery portions of the experiment. Moreover, the observed 
increase in the region of uncertainty in the imagery condition is rather close to the center of 
the screen (see Figure 5C). If the effect were due to increased attentional resource allocation 
to the center of the screen when imagining the stimuli, one would predict that the effect 
would occur for sounds presented much further away from the center of the screen rather than 
the fine-tuned convergence we see in our results. Furthermore, one might also just as well 
predicted that if the imagined visual stimulus enhanced visual attention to the center of the 
screen, the participants’ left-right discrimination performance should be better in the no-
imagery trials than in the imagery trials.  Lastly, the behavioral results obtained from the 
scanner in Study III also serve to rule out that spatial attention alone can produce these 
results, as we found that synchronously imagined visual (and real auditory) stimuli lead to a 
significantly larger ventriloquist-effect than asynchronously imagined visual stimuli (i.e., two 
conditions which are matched in attention). Importantly, this result is also consistent with the 
temporal rule of multisensory integration.  
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    In Study IV, we once again made use of the ventriloquism effect but to a new end. In this 
experiment, we examined whether the translocation observed in the previous imagery-
induced ventriloquism studies could produce the same ventriloquism aftereffects observed for 
real audiovisual stimuli (Frissen et al., 2012, 2005; Jain, Sally, & Papathomas, 2008; 
Recanzone, 1998; Woods & Recanzone, 2004). Once again, we wanted to rule out the 
possibility that the participants’ responses could be explained by response biases or 
attentional mechanisms alone.  Thus, we designed the experiment in such a way that the 
predicted shift in perception, would be in the opposite direction of directed attention. That is, 
the participants always imagined the visual stimulus in the center of the screen, and the 
auditory stimuli were presented to the left, the right, or the in the same location as the 
imagined visual stimulus (and to the left, right, or same location as fixation) during the 
exposure phases (i.e., repeated pairings of spatially discrepant imagined visual and real 
auditory stimuli). In the test phases, if one had noticed that the auditory stimulus came from 
the left or the right (although most participants did not because the auditory stimuli were 
translocated towards the imagined visual stimulus in the center), then the most obvious 
response strategy would be for them to respond more favorably to the left, and right, 
respectively when presented with sounds from different locations during the test phase. 
However, our predicted (and observed) aftereffect was in the opposite direction (i.e., the 
participants should respond that they heard auditory stimuli in the test phases in the opposite 
direction of the location of the auditory stimuli in the exposure phases (in left-sound, and 
right-sound adaptation conditions). These findings rule out that the participants were 
responding on the basis of implicit or explicit response strategies. Furthermore, in line with 
classic ventriloquism aftereffect studies which have demonstrated that the ventriloquism 
aftereffect does not transfer across auditory stimuli of disparate frequencies (Recanzone, 
1998; Woods & Recanzone, 2004), we examined whether the imagery-induced aftereffect 
also showed the same auditory stimulus specificity. We found that the imagery-induced 
ventriloquism aftereffect did not transfer across different sounds-types, suggesting that,  (a) 
these results cannot be explained by some sort of ‘ironic spatial attention mechanism’ 
whereby hearing auditory stimuli to the left or right repeatedly produces a response tendency 
in the opposite direction independent of the imagined visual stimulus, and (b) that this 
imagery-induced ventriloquism aftereffect adheres to the multisensory integration principles 
of real audiovisual stimuli.  
     Furthermore, we also made use of the ventriloquist effect in Study III, but to examine 
whether the imagery-induced ventriloquism effect was associated with activation in key areas 
of the cortex involved in audiovisual integration; namely the STS and its neural connections 
with the auditory cortex.  One important consideration of early fMRI experiments on 
multisensory integration was how to assess whether BOLD activation in response to 
audiovisual stimuli reflected multisensory integration (i.e., responses that reflect the 
integration of audiovisual stimuli as were first characterized by electrophysiology recordings 
in mammals) or merely reflected the activation of two separate populations of unisensory 
neurons intermingled in the same area (i.e., voxel). In light of the response properties of some 
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multisensory neurons observed in electrophysiology studies, which responded 
superadditively to cross-modal stimuli (i.e., more to the presentation of cross-modal stimuli 
than to the sum of the responses to unisensory stimuli presented alone), it was proposed that 
this strict threshold be used to dissociate unisensory from multisensory activation in BOLD 
responses observed in human neuroimaging experiments (Calvert, 2001). Adhering to this 
criterion, neuroimaging experiments in humans have observed superadditive BOLD 
responses in the STS in response to audiovisual speech and non-speech stimuli (Calvert et al., 
2000, 2001; Stevenson, Geoghegan, & James, 2007; Werner & Noppeney, 2010b). It has 
been argued, however, that this criterion is too strict and will lead to too many false 
negatives, and further it is also not entirely immune to mis-characterizations (i.e., 
superadditivity can be observed as the result in deactivation of a region compared to resting 
baseline in response to a unimodal stimulus). Thus, when possible, a better characterization 
of multisensory responses can be obtained in neuroimaging experiments by manipulating the 
relationship between the audiovisual stimuli along some dimension which would lead to 
predicted differences in their integration in accordance with the basic principles of 
multisensory integration (i.e., spatial, temporal, inverse effectiveness) (Calvert & Thesen, 
2004; Calvert, 2001). In our experiment, we first manipulated the temporal relationship 
between real visual and real auditory stimuli, and examined the BOLD responses to 
synchronous compared to asynchronous audiovisual stimuli in the entire brain. Consistent 
with previous studies, we observed increased BOLD responses in the STS for synchronously 
compared to asynchronously presented stimuli. We then performed the same comparison for 
imagined visual stimuli, and also found increased activity in the STS. Moreover, we 
performed a PPI analysis and observed increased effective connectivity between the STS and 
auditory cortex for synchronously compared to asynchronously presented real audiovisual 
stimuli, and found the same increased connectivity for synchronously imagined visual and 
real auditory stimuli compared to asynchronously imagined visual and real auditory stimuli.  
Thus, the same BOLD responses and connectivity patterns indicative of multisensory 
integration of real audiovisual stimuli were observed for imagined visual and real auditory 
stimuli as well. Furthermore, in whole-brain regression analyses we found that the behavioral 
index of the strength of the imagery-induced ventriloquist effect significantly predicted the 
strength of the BOLD response in the STS and the strength of the connectivity between the 
STS and auditory cortex for synchronously vs. asynchronously imagined visual and real 
auditory stimuli.  These findings provide strong support for the notion that simultaneously 
imagined and real cross-modal stimuli lead to multisensory integration, and serve to provide 
further support for the behavioral evidence of multisensory integration obtained from the 
other studies in this thesis. Together, the findings from Studies I-V provide strong support 
for perception-based theories of mental imagery, and suggest that the perceptual experience 
of imagined sensory stimuli is supported by a largely overlapping neural representations of 
real and imagined sensory stimuli in the human cortex.  
     What are the limitations of mental imagery-perception interactions? Although we have 
been able to establish a place for mental imagery in multisensory perception, there are also 
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certain limitations to cross-modal interactions from imagined sensory stimuli. For instance, in 
pilot experiments, we examined whether auditory imagery could induce the sound-induced 
flash illusion (Shams, Kamitani, & Shimojo, 2000) without much success. In the sound-
induced flash illusion the presentation of two or more beeps presented at the same time as a 
single visual stimulus produces the illusory perception that there was more than one visual 
stimulus presented (Shams et al., 2000). One possible explanation for why imagined auditory 
stimuli were unable to produce this illusion, is that mental imagery requires more processing 
time than its bottom up counterpart. This is consistent with behavioral evidence suggesting 
that it can take between 400 ms and 500 ms for participants to successfully generate a clear 
mental image from cue until image generation (Weber & Castleman, 1970). In the sound 
induced flash illusion the auditory stimuli which produce the illusion are presented for only 7 
ms and only 57 ms apart (Andersen, Tiippana, & Sams, 2004; Shams et al., 2000). Thus, 
these rapid stimulus presentations may very well lie outside the scope of what is possible to 
simulate endogenously. Furthermore, matching the timing of the imagined auditory stimulus 
in this illusion is extremely difficult as the visual stimuli are only presented very briefly (< 20 
ms), and the sound-induced flash illusion is much less forgiving about temporal disparities 
between the audiovisual stimuli than the other multisensory illusions we have managed to 
find cross-modal effects of imagery for (Andersen et al., 2004). For example, the sound 
induced flash illusion is abolished with temporal disparities between the auditory and visual 
stimulus as small as 100 ms (Shams et al., 2000), whereas the McGurk illusion persists for 
temporal disparities between the auditory and visual stimuli of up to 200 ms (van 
Wassenhove, Grant, & Poeppel, 2007).  
     Can mental imagery be studied in animals? Most of what we know about the neural 
foundations of mental imagery comes form behavioral and neuroimaging techniques in 
humans. This is, of course, because of the nature of mental imagery: you cannot just politely 
ask monkeys, cats, mice, hamsters, or zebrafish (etc…) to imagine things for us.  
Furthermore, even if we could, it is unclear whether they have the same phenomenological 
experiences humans do when doing so.  However, it has been argued that mental imagery can 
be evoked clearly and vividly without the conscious intention to do so. Conceptually, this is 
nicely demonstrated by Wegner’s studies on ironic processing—one cannot help but to 
imagine a white bear, even when explicitly instructed not to (Wegner, 1994).  In Wegner’s 
example, whether the result is mental image or conceptual was not of particular interest; 
however, if I ask you not to imagine a spider, you likely just did so, and if spiders bother you, 
I would wager that it is not the ‘idea’ of the spider but your quasi-sensorial experience (i.e., 
your mental image) of it that you find disturbing. One clear example of the automatic 
elicitation of visual mental images comes from experiments which have found that 
understanding motion language can produce a visual motion aftereffect (i.e., an aftereffect of 
visual perception in which static objects are perceived as moving in the opposite direction of 
previously moving visual stimuli)—suggesting that the linguistic descriptions of visual 
motion produce sufficiently vivid mental images that a visual motion aftereffect could be 
induced as a result even without the participants’ conscious intention to imagine the visual 
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stimuli (Dils & Boroditsky, 2010; Winawer et al., 2010). Following this same logic, Schlack 
and Albright (2007) trained monkeys to associate visual motion of specific directions with 
specific static objects and then examined whether visual motion-sensitive neurons in the 
medial temporal cortex (i.e., visual area MT) demonstrated motion selectivity for the 
previously paired static objects.  They found that MT neurons now displayed direction 
selectivity for the static objects compared to pre-training presentations of those same static 
objects, suggesting that following training, the static object automatically elicited a visual 
mental image of the moving stimulus (Albright, 2012; Schlack & Albright, 2007). Of course, 
whether the monkey experienced this visual image in a similar way (phenomenologically 
speaking) as the human participants in Dils and Boroditsky’s (2010) experiment cannot be 
verified, and therefore, such findings should be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, these 
studies open up an exciting new avenue for examining the neurophysiological basis for 
mental imagery.   
     How can our findings be useful in a clinical setting? One possible clinical application of 
our findings could be for research and development on the use of motor imagery to control 
robotic prosthetic limbs. If imagined motor stimuli are capable of integrating with real 
sensory feedback provided by a prosthesis, this could have important implications for the 
development of neurally controlled prosthetics. Furthermore, the fact that we have found that 
the integration of real and imagined sensory stimuli can lead to cross-modal plasticity 
suggests that our findings may be useful in a physical medicine and rehabilitation setting. For 
example, although research has found that mental imagery of motor movements may not 
necessarily be more effective than control tasks in restoring motor function in stroke patients 
(Ietswaart et al., 2011), it may be the case that mental imagery in a different sensory modality 
(e.g., visual imagery) is easier and more effective in restoring motor function.  Furthermore, 
our findings may be useful in the study of dissociative disorders in which a breakdown in 
reality monitoring and hallucinations are prevalent; scenarios in which patients fail to 
distinguish between exogenous and endogenous sensory percepts (Johnson, 2006; Plaze et al., 
2011). In schizophrenia, for example, it has been found that auditory hallucinations are the 
result of patients’ inability to distinguish between self-generated speech and external speech 
(Bentall, 1990; Johns et al., 2001). One prevalent theory regarding the source of positive 
symptoms in schizophrenia, such as hallucinations, delusions, and confused thoughts and 
speech, is that they are the result of abnormal interactions or integration between different 
cortical areas of the brain (Friston & Frith, 1995).  Thus, investigating whether schizophrenic 
patients demonstrate an increased propensity for mental imagery induced multisensory 
illusions could provide further support for this possibility. 
     Further research on mental imagery induced multisensory illusions may be useful in 
examining exactly how it is that we are capable of distinguishing between real and imagined 
sensory stimuli during everyday perception.  Perhaps, for example, the perceived difference 
in our perception of real and imagined stimuli relies on fine-grain patterns of activity within 
sensory and association cortices.  Alternatively, it may also be the case that mental imagery 
and perception rely on the same fine-grain patterns of activity in these regions, and that the 
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differences instead lie with connectivity of the pre-frontal cortex to sensory and association 
cortices (such a finding would be in line with the proposed mechanism for failures to 
distinguish between endogenous and exogenous sensory percepts during hallucinations in 
schizophrenic patients, for example). Future neuroimaging experiments, which make use of 
additional analysis techniques such as MVPA, may be useful in examining these questions. 
Future experiments will also be useful in examining the neural basis of the imagery induced 
ventriloquism aftereffect.  
     In conclusion, it is clear that mental imagery has an important role to play in perception. 
More importantly, it also has an important role to play in multisensory perception. 
Multisensory integration is critical for our perception of the world around us and for our 
ability to act within it. The fact that mental imagery has a role to play in that process at all, let 
alone to the extent that we have observed in the studies within this thesis is both curious and 
fascinating. The studies I have presented here have only begun to scratch the surface of the 
complicated relationship between what we imagine in our minds and what we perceive in the 
external world, and I hope that future research in this line will continue to further our 
understanding of this complicated relationship.  Future research will also serve to explore the 
boundaries between imagination and multisensory perception in order to determine how we 
are able to distinguish between these otherwise very similar processes. 
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